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33 
THE MEANING OF GREEN GROWTH 
Michael A. Livermore* 
Although the term is still rarely used in the United States, in recent years 
“green growth” has become part of the lexicon of global environmental policy. 
Unfortunately, although it is frequently cited as a public policy goal, green growth 
has remained vague and ill-defined, leading to conflicting interpretations and 
confusion over the distinction between green growth and related concepts like 
sustainable development. This paper seeks to clarify the meaning of green growth 
as a distinct concept, defining a “green growth frontier” of policies that dominate 
along both environmental and economic dimensions. The green growth agenda 
can be understood as moving societies toward that frontier of cost-effective and 
environmentally effective policies. Because movements toward this frontier gen-
erate gains along multiple dimensions, they should be less controversial and may 
allow for some progress toward economic and environmental goals even in con-
texts where broader political consensus over environmental policies is difficult to 
form. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the recent failure of climate change treaty negotiations in Copen-
hagen, Durban, and Doha to make substantial progress on establishing 
mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions,1 hope for a global response 
to the climate change crisis in the near term has faded.2 Current negotia-
tions at the international level have focused largely on how to cope with the 
reality of climate change and establishing timelines for future efforts.3 The 
need for a global response has become no less urgent, but political will in 
support of aggressive international efforts remains in short supply. 
Partially in response to failures at the international level, the concept of 
green growth as a paradigm for domestic policymaking has grown in prom-
inence. Although the term is rarely used in the United States,4 in recent 
years green growth has joined other concepts like sustainable development, 
environmental justice, and the precautionary principle in the lexicon of 
                                                                                                                      
 1. The Durban conference concluded with an agreement to continue to study possi-
ble methods to combat climate change and with a resolution to develop a protocol by 2015, 
be implemented in 2020. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28, 2011–Dec. 9, 2011, Establishment 
of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2011/L.10 (Dec. 10, 2011), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/ 
eng/l10.pdf [hereinafter Durban Platform]. 
 2. Many explanations have been offered for the difficulty of reaching a climate 
change bargain. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game-Theoretic Model of International Climate 
Change Negotiations, 19 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 14, 24–28 (2011); Why Did Copenhagen Fail to 
Deliver a Climate Deal?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/ 
nature/8426835.stm. 
 3. See Durban Platform, supra note 1. Under the Copenhagen Accord, developed 
countries have committed to spending $100 billion USD annually to mitigate the effects of 
climate change. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7–19, 2009, Copenhagen Accord, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf. 
 4. A search on Lexis.com of the phrase “green growth” in federal and state courts 
turned up a single case where the concept was relevant: American Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los 
Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096 (2013). In that case, the Port o� Los Angeles claimed that its Clean 
Truck Plan, which regulated the behavior of trucking companies using the Port with the goal 
of reducing pollution, was undertaken to promote its business interests as part of a “green 
growth plan.” Id. at 2103. The Court held that, regardless of the Port’s intentions, it was 
acting with “the force and effect o� law” when it adopted criminal sanctions as part of the 
regulation, and its rule was therefore preempted under the Federal Aviation Administration 
Authorization Act of 1994. Id. at 2104–05. Nor is the phrase common in the secondary 
literature. But see Stuart Eizenstat, The U.S. Role in Solving Climate Change: Green Growth 
Policies Can Enable Leadership Despite the Economic Downturn, 30 ENERGY L.J. 1 (2009); infra 
note 5. 
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global environmental policy. There is hope in some quarters that the con-
cept of green growth can provide a way forward in the absence of a global 
climate change treaty, or at least a bridge from the current situation, where 
there is an absence of even local climate change policy in most domestic 
contexts, to a comprehensive and binding global agreement. 
Although the words “green growth” have become a common sight in 
business plans, international agreements, press statements, and government 
policy pronouncements, the meaning of the concept remains fuzzy, and 
often varies depending on the speaker and the context.5 What it actually 
means for domestic policymaking—what green growth really looks like in 
terms of institutions or substantive outcomes—is still unclear. Unless this 
vagueness is resolved, the concept cannot actually structure decisionmaking 
and policy choices, and its utility for addressing climate change or any other 
environmental challenge will remain extremely limited. 
This paper examines the term green growth and how it has been used 
in global environmental discourse, with the goal of identifying a concept 
that can be operationalized within domestic policymaking contexts, espe-
cially in developing and emerging economies. Reviewing the related 
concept of sustainable development as well as discussions of green growth 
by government officials, think tanks, and academics, a core definition of the 
green growth agenda is developed. This definition seeks to carve out a 
meaning of green growth that is distinct from similar ideas, achieves some 
degree of consistency with past statements about green growth, and is clear 
enough that it can be helpful for policymakers.  
This paper argues that a useful definition of green growth centers on 
the goal of reducing conflicts between economic growth and environmental 
quality. This can be done in two ways. The first is through a version of 
economic cost-effectiveness analysis, a concept that seeks to identify how to 
achieve environmental goals with the lowest possible economic harm. Eco-
nomic cost-effectiveness analysis has been around for decades and is a 
staple of public policy analysis. The second component of green growth is 
environmental-effectiveness analysis, which seeks to achieve economic goals  
in ways that cause the least environmental harm. Environmental  
                                                                                                                      
 5. In some contexts, “green growth” refers to job growth “in the green job creation 
movement.” Jonathan C. Augustine, A National Model for Disaster Recovery: Growing Green 
Jobs in the Age of Energy Efficiency, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 179, 184–85 (2012). In other 
contexts, “green growth” means “the creation of economic value through environmentally 
protective actions.” Laura S. Henry et al., From Smelter Fumes to Silk Road Winds: Exploring 
Legal Responses to Transboundary Air Pollution Over South Korea, 11 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. 
REV. 565, 625 (2012). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) defines green growth as “promoting economic growth while reducing pollution and 
GHG emissions, minimizing waste and inefficient use of natural resources, and maintaining 
biodiversity.” Ruth Gordon, The Environmental Implications of China’s Engagement with Sub-
Saharan Africa, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 11109, 11118 n.108 (2012). 
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cost-effectiveness analysis is simply the mirror image of economic cost-
effectiveness analysis. 
Unlike the somewhat related concept of sustainable development, the 
concept of green growth does not embed a particular aspiration for envi-
ronmental quality or economic growth, but rather embodies the goal of 
achieving economic growth and environmental quality goals in ways that 
are effective—that is, at the lowest possible cost to the other social goal. 
The concept of green growth is not dispositive of social policy; it does not 
provide an answer to the appropriate levels of economic growth or envi-
ronmental protection that ought to be achieved. That question must be 
answered independently by policymakers. What the green growth agenda 
does do, however, is encourage policymakers to choose a path toward eco-
nomic or environmental goals that mitigates, to the extent possible, the 
negative side effects of those choices.  
Stated another way, green growth can be defined as the frontier of poli-
cy choices between environmental quality and economic growth: at any 
point along that frontier, there are no ways to improve environmental quali-
ty or economic growth without sacrificing the other. At points interior to 
this frontier, it is possible to make gains along both dimensions simultane-
ously. This does not mean that movement toward this frontier is costless. It 
may affect the profitability of certain firms or displace workers in particular 
industrial sectors or regions; it may also involve tradeoffs between particu-
lar environmental goods. But, on net, any costs to growth or the 
environment would be compensated by benefits along the same dimension, 
so that, other things being equal, movement toward the frontier is socially 
beneficial. Unlike the concept of sustainable development, or ideas like 
environmental justice, the precautionary principle, or cost-benefit analysis, 
green growth has nothing to say about how choices should be made along 
the frontier. Yet while movement toward this frontier may seem like an 
uncontroversial goal, in many governmental contexts, policy options to do 
so have not yet been fully grasped.  
Providing a useful definition of green growth is only the first step: gov-
ernments must also realize the concept in practice for it to have any 
significant environmental effects. There are several institutional and sub-
stantive reforms that can be used to better incorporate green growth into 
policymaking. A core area for promoting green growth is through tools and 
institutions associated with regulatory quality initiatives, such as regulatory 
impact analysis and the use of market mechanisms for achieving environ-
mental goals. Societies making decisions aimed at spurring economic 
growth can attend to environmental effects through widespread tools like 
environmental impact analysis, and can in addition choose development 
pathways that focus on the creation of sustainable industries and the protec-
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tion of environmental resources. Focusing on development factors other 
than consumption growth by emphasizing the effect of policy on distribu-
tional goals, welfare, or human capabilities can also help societies reduce 
environmental impacts without sacrificing short-term human well-being. 
This paper proceeds in three parts. In Part I, green growth is placed in 
the context of other international environmental norms, especially the 
concept of sustainable development. Part II provides a definition of green 
growth as the policies that fall along the frontier of tradeoffs between eco-
nomic growth and environmental quality and discusses how that definition 
fits in with some of the rhetoric surrounding green growth as well as stand-
ard economic models of environmental policy. Part III provides a discussion 
of what governments can do to promote green growth by attending more 
carefully to the goals of development and implementing a set of institution-
al and substantive reforms concerning regulation and policymaking.  
I. GREEN GROWTH IN CONTEXT 
As soon as green growth made its entrance on the international stage, 
the concept was overshadowed by older and more established ideas. For 
example, a Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Development in 
Asia and the Pacific, adopted in 2005 in Seoul, Korea, stated the following:  
[T]here is a need to shift the development orientation from a 
“Grow first, clean up later” approach to one of Green 
Growth . . . [with] Green Growth . . . understood in this context to 
mean sustainable development, as elaborated in the Johannesburg 
Plan o� Implementation.6 
The Declaration goes on to equate “environmentally sustainable eco-
nomic growth” with “Green Growth.”7 In an address a few years later, 
President Lee Myung-bak o� Korea defined green growth in a similar fash-
ion as “sustainable growth which helps reduce greenhouse gas emission and 
environmental pollution.”8  
Of course, the notion of sustainability invoked to define green growth 
has a multi-decade history in both international environmental discourse 
and in economics, with its own complex meanings and uses. If green growth 
                                                                                                                      
 6. Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development in Asia and the 
Pacific, Mar. 28–29, 2005, Report of the Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development 
in Asia and the Pacific, at 19, U.N. Doc. E/ESCAP/MCED(05) (Apr. 20, 2005). 
 7. Id. 
 8. President Lee Myung-bak, A Great People with New Dreams, Address on the 
63rd Anniversary o� National Liberation and the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the 
Republic o� Korea (Aug. 15, 2008), available at http://english.president.go.kr/pre_activity/ 
speeches/speeches_view.php?uno=270. 
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is equated directly to sustainable development then it has no independent 
meaning—it is nothing more than a case of the proverbial old wine in a new 
bottle. If green growth amounts to repackaging of a well-established con-
cept, then if offers very little use for policymakers. 
This part will discuss the evolution of the concept of sustainable devel-
opment in international environmental discourse and in economics over the 
past several decades and will examine some of the political issues that have 
hampered its implementation in actual government policy. The failure of 
sustainable development to have a major influence in shaping domestic 
policymaking helped motivate the desire for a new agenda in the environ-
mental area. But unless the new agenda is different from the old agenda, it 
is likely to meet a similar fate.  
A. Sustainable Development in Law and Economics 
Because sustainable development remains a dominant concept in envi-
ronmental discourse, especially on the international stage, it casts a long 
shadow over green growth. This section provides a brief overview of the 
concept of sustainable development in the areas of international law and 
economics to help provide some sense of the background understanding 
that informs interpretations of green growth.  
The concept of sustainable development was formally presented on the 
global stage by the World Commission on Environment and Development’s 
1987 report Our Common Future, commonly referred to as the Brundtland 
Report.9 The Commission defined sustainable development as “develop-
ment that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
o� future generations to meet their own needs.”10 The Brundtland Report 
introduced several elements that would become closely associated with the 
concept of sustainable development, including recognition of the im-
portance of efforts to meet basic human needs and alleviate poverty despite 
the range of political, technological, cultural, and environmental constraints 
faced by human societies.11 
The concerns expressed in the Brundtland Report themselves grew out 
of the “second wave of environmentalism,” which is generally dated to the 
publication o� Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962.12 This publication, 
along with The Limits to Growth, commissioned by the Club o� Rome and 
                                                                                                                      
 9. See MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER & ASHFAQ KHALFAN, SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PROSPECTS 18 (2004). 
 10. World Comm’n on Env’t and Dev., Report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development: Our Common Future, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987). 
 11. SEGGER & KHALFAN, supra note 9, at 18–19.  
 12. Kathryn Hochstetler, Book Review, 8 J. POL. ECOLOGY 82, 83 (2001) (discussing 
role of RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962)). 
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published in 1972,13 and The Population Bomb, authored by Paul R. Ehrlich 
and published in 1968,14 called global attention to the risks posed by indus-
trialization and the expansion of the human population and called for some 
quite radical policy responses to reduce human impacts on the environ-
ment. These works themselves have roots in a set of concerns about natural 
limits on consumption that stretch at least as far back as Malthus.15 
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, often referred to as the “Earth Summit,” carried forward the concept 
of sustainable development.16 It also illustrates how political barriers have 
hampered efforts to more firmly integrate sustainability concerns into 
policymaking.17 The proclamations produced by the conference—including 
the 1992 Rio Declaration and Programme of Action; Agenda 21, a compre-
hensive “plan of action” on sustainability; and a statement of principles on 
sustainable forestry management—were all non-binding, and states were 
careful to ensure that no legal obligations would arise from their participa-
tion.18 These documents, which presented lofty goals, and even some 
specific policy tools, were ultimately aspirational and lacked even the lim-
ited action-forcing power of international law. 
In the Rio Declaration, the concept of sustainable development incorpo-
rates a range of social goals within a general frame of “equitably meet[ing] 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future genera-
tions.”19 The first two principles place human concerns at the center of the 
concept of sustainable development and carefully affirm the “sovereign 
right” of countries regarding their own natural resources.20 A number of 
non-environmental considerations are brought within the fold of sustaina-
ble development, including “eradicating poverty”21 and issues of 
“[w]arfare,” “[p]eace,” and interstate conflict.22 The roles of “[w]omen,” “the 
youth of the world,” and “[i]ndigenous people” are also specifically men-
                                                                                                                      
 13. DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972). 
 14. PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968). 
 15. See THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (Elec-
tronic Scholarly Publishing Project 1998) (1798). 
 16. DUNCAN FRENCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 17–18 (2005).  
 17. Id. at 17. 
 18. Id. at 18 (noting rhetorical importance of the Rio Declaration, infra note 19). 
 19. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, 
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, principle 3, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
 20. Id. principles 1–2. 
 21. Id. principle 5. 
 22. Id. principles 24–26. 
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tioned;23 the importance of “participation” is emphasized; and the concept 
of “common but differentiated responsibilities” is endorsed.24  
The declaration also includes some specific language that deals with 
policy design. The document discourages the export and import o� hazard-
ous waste and trade protectionism achieved through environmental 
regulation.25 Liability regimes for victims of pollution, economic instru-
ments to internalize environmental costs, environmental impact assessment, 
and a weak version of the precautionary principle are encouraged.26 The 
declaration also calls on states to “reduce and eliminate unsustainable  
patterns of production and consumption and promote appropriate demo-
graphic policies.”27 
The World Summit on Sustainable Development, referred to as Earth 
Summit 2002,28 with the resulting Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable 
Development and the Plan o� Implementation of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, included further discussion of sustainable devel-
opment. The Johannesburg Declaration takes an expansive view of 
sustainable development and threats to sustainable development, listing a 
range of environmental threats, such as biodiversity loss, desertification, 
and climate change,29 as well as economic challenges, including globaliza-
tion30 and poverty and inequality.31 A large number of social ills were 
identified as “severe threats to . . . sustainable development” that required 
“priority attention,” including the following: 
chronic hunger; malnutrition; foreign occupation; armed conflict; 
illicit drug problems; organized crime; corruption; natural disas-
ters; illicit arms trafficking; trafficking in persons; terrorism; 
                                                                                                                      
 23. Id. principles 20–22. 
 24. Id. principles 7, 10. 
 25. Id. principles 12, 14. 
 26. Id. principles 13, 15–17. For a discussion of “weak” versus “strong” precautionary 
approaches, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Paralyzing Principle, REGULATION, Winter 2002–03, at 32. 
 27. Rio Declaration, supra note 19, principle 8. 
 28. See Sam Headon, Whose Sustainable Development? Sustainable Development Under 
the Kyoto Protocol, the “Coldplay Effect,” and the CDM Gold Standard, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 127, 132 n.18 (2009) (referring to the World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment as Earth Summit 2002); see also, Shawkat Alam, An Examination of the International 
Environmental Law Governing the Proposed Indian River-Linking Project and an Appraisal of Its 
Ecological and Socio-Economic Implications for Lower Riparian Countries, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. 
L. REV. 209, 218 n.42 (2007) (referring to World Summit on Sustainable Development as 
Earth Summit 2002). 
 29. World Summit for Sustainable Development, Aug. 26–Sept. 4, 2002, Johannesburg 
Declaration on Sustainable Development, principle 13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20, Annex PP 3 
(2002), available at http://www.un.org/jsummit/html/documents/summit_docs/131302_ 
wssd_report_reissued.pdf. 
 30. Id. principle 14. 
 31. Id. principles 11–12. 
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intolerance and incitement to racial, ethnic, religious and other ha-
treds; xenophobia; and endemic, communicable and chronic 
diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.32 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) also include a specific 
goal to “Ensure Environmental Sustainability.” The specific targets under 
this goal include “integrat[ing] the principles of sustainable development 
into country policies and programmes and revers[ing] the loss of environ-
mental resources,” as well as improving access to sanitation and drinking 
water and improving the “lives of . . . slum dwellers.”33 Indicators for sus-
tainability include measures o� forest preservation, species protection, and 
carbon intensity.34 
As this brief survey suggests, over the course of its history within in-
ternational environmental law and discourse, the concept of sustainable 
development has become incredibly capacious.35 As early as 1992, only five 
years after the Brundtland Report, commentators were noting the prolifera-
tion of definitions of sustainable development, with dozens of potential 
definitions emanating from international legal documents and statements of 
academics and non-governmental organizations.36 From the wide range of 
societal challenges discussed in the Johannesburg Declaration, it might be 
thought that sustainable development has come to represent a general set o� 
human aspirations.  
That said, many of the definitions and uses of the concept have main-
tained some definitional integrity, with notions of intergenerational 
responsibility and equity, especially in the context o� balancing environ-
mental resource use with human demands, forming a common core. This 
definition is the one that has been relied on when international courts have 
referenced sustainable development in determining whether the concept 
has any bearing on the obligations of states under their international 
agreements. For example, the International Court of Justice, in its Gabciko-
vo-Nagymaros decision, referenced the “need to reconcile economic 
development with protection of the environment [which] is aptly expressed 
                                                                                                                      
 32. Id. principle 19. 
 33. THE WORLD BANK GROUP, ICT AND MDGS: A WORLD BANK GROUP 
PERSPECTIVE 2 (2003). 
 34. Official List of MDG Indicators, U.N. STATISTICS DIV., http://mdgs.un.org/ 
unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm (last visited June 26, 2012). 
 35. For a compilation of over forty definitions given to the term, see DAVID PEARCE, 
ANIL MARKANDYA, & EDWARD B. BARBIER, BLUEPRINT FOR A GREEN ECONOMY 173–85 
(1987). 
 36. JOHN PEZZEY, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 55–62 (1992) (presenting an extensive list of definitions). 
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in the concept of sustainable development.”37 Similarly, the Appellate Body 
of the World Trade Organization noted in the Shrimp/Turtle case that sus-
tainable development has “been generally accepted as integrating economic 
and social development and environmental protection.”38  
Within the field of economics, there has been a parallel sustainability 
discourse. The focus within the economics community has been on formal-
izing concepts of sustainability to determine what consequences it has for 
economic variables like consumption growth. While often highly theoreti-
cal, debates about the exact meaning and contours of sustainability within 
the field of economics have helped clarify and illuminate some of the core 
challenges in developing coherent policies aimed at achieving sustainable 
development. 
Three classic papers that helped define the field were published simul-
taneously by Dasgupta and Heal,39 Stiglitz,40 and Solow41 in The Review of 
Economic Studies in 1974. These papers helped set the stage for the rich 
subsequent literature and preview some of the main concerns that arise in 
economic discussions over sustainability. 
Dasgupta and Heal developed a model that was based on the principle 
that economic actors can be expected to maximize the net present value of 
their decisions. Net present value is a standard economic concept that helps 
facilitate comparison between the effects of a decision that occur at differ-
ent times. Under the standard formulation, funds spent or received in the 
future are discounted to reflect the time value of money based on invest-
ment returns and consumer preferences. Under the Dasgupta and Heal 
model, even without population growth, with finite resources and no tech-
nological growth, net present value maximization results in the complete 
depletion of a limited natural resource stock.42 
The Stiglitz model introduced technological growth and found that 
sustainability could be achieved as well as net present value optimization. 
The linchpin of this model was the assumption of continuing technological 
                                                                                                                      
 37. SEGGER & KHAFLAN, supra note 9, at 48 (referencing Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25)). 
 38. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (referencing Appellate Body Report, United 
States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 
1998)). 
 39. Partha Dasgupta & Geoffrey Heal, The Optimal Depletion of Exhaustible Resources, 
41 REV. ECON. STUD. 3 (1974).  
 40. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Growth with Exhaustible Natural Resources: The Competitive 
Economy, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 123 (1974). 
 41. R.M. Solow, Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources, 41 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 29 (1974).  
 42. See generally Dasgupta & Heal, supra note 39. 
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development, which allowed for ever-greater levels of consumption to be 
attained from the finite resource stock.43  
Solow abandoned the net present value maximization framework for an 
alternative decisionmaking framework that required consumption to be 
maintained at current levels, or increased, indefinitely.44 Solow found that 
consumption levels could be maintained indefinitely, so long as human 
capital is accumulated fast enough to offset resource depletion.45 Building 
on Solow’s work, John Hartwick developed a model showing that sustaina-
bility—that is, non-decreasing consumption levels—can be achieved if all 
rents from exhaustible resources are invested in man-made capital.46 This 
rule is sometimes referred to as Hartwick’s rule. One of the central linch-
pins o� Hartwick’s rule is the unlimited substitutability between natural 
resources and other forms of capital. With this assumption in place, a set of 
policies that maintain a constant stock of capital per capita will result in 
constant consumption, putting aside technological development.47 
The Solow-Hartwick conception of sustainability was challenged by 
environmental economist Herman Daly, who proposed instead a version of 
“strong sustainability” that does not allow for unlimited substitution be-
tween natural resources and other capital.48 Arguing that “the basic relation 
of man-made and natural capital is one of complementarity, not substituta-
bility,”49 Daly proposes three conditions for sustainability: harvest cannot 
exceed regeneration of renewable resources; waste emissions cannot exceed 
assimilative capacities of environmental media; and non-renewable natural 
resources may only be depleted if replaced by renewable natural resource 
substitutes.50 
Discussions of sustainability within endogenous growth theory in the 
past two decades build on Stiglitz’s solution to achieving sustainability 
through technology, but with greater emphasis on the determinants and 
consequences of technological growth. There are several characteristics of 
                                                                                                                      
 43. See Stiglitz, supra note 40, at 141–45. 
 44. See generally Solow, supra note 41. 
 45. Id. at 37. 
 46. John M. Hartwick, Intergenerational Equity and the Investing of Rents from Exhausti-
ble Resources, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 972 (1977). 
 47. Robert M. Solow, On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural Resources, 88 
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 141, 144–45 (1986). 
 48. Herman E. Daly, Operationalizing Sustainable Development by Investing in Natural 
Capital, in INVESTING IN NATURAL CAPITAL: THE ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS APPROACH TO 
SUSTAINABILITY 22, 24–25 (AnnMari Jansson et al. eds., 1994); Herman E. Daly, Toward 
Some Operational Principles of Sustainable Development, 2 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1 (1990). 
 49. Daly, Operationalizing Sustainable Development by Investing in Natural Capital, supra 
note 48, at 26.  
 50. Herman Daly, Can We Grow Our Way Into an Environmentally Sustainable World?, 
in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: SELECTED ESSAYS OF 
HERMAN DALY 57–58 (2007). 
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endogenous growth theory that have important ramifications for sustaina-
bility. One is that “decreasing returns with respect to man-made capital . . . 
are absent,”51 which allows for perpetual growth. This is possible because 
capital includes knowledge, both technical know-how as well as a variety of 
social forms o� knowledge that support economic productivity. This form of 
capital may escape diminishing returns “[i]f social interaction, economic 
activity, investment and problem solving yield new ideas and i� knowledge 
spillovers inspire others.”52 
Even with the possibility of unlimited technological development, en-
dogenous growth models do not imply that markets will naturally tend 
toward sustainability or continuing growth absent government intervention. 
A variety of skewed incentives, including the externalization of pollution 
costs, can distort incentives for investment in the optimal basket of poten-
tial technologies and may lead to unsustainable levels of resource  
depletion.53  
B. Saving Green Growth from the Fate of Sustainability  
Although, as discussed above, there are many disparate conceptions of 
sustainable development in the fields o� law and economics, there are some 
contours that are generally shared, the most important being aspirations 
concerning the intergenerational distribution of resources and the balancing 
of environmental goals with a wide range of other social priorities.54  
The aspirational elements of sustainable development—both with re-
spect to intergenerational responsibility and environmental balance—track 
some prominent statements concerning green growth. For example, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) gave 
the following definition in its report on its Green Growth Strategy: 
“[G]reen growth can be seen as a way to pursue economic growth and de-
velopment, while preventing environmental degradation, biodiversity loss 
and unsustainable natural resource use.”55 The United Nations Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific states that “[g]reen growth 
                                                                                                                      
 51. Sjak Smulders, Endogenous Growth Theory and the Environment, in HANDBOOK OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 610, 613 (Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh ed., 
1999). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 616. 
 54. Stavins et al. refer to these two sets of concerns as the “efficiency” and the “equi-
ty” sides of sustainable development. Robert N. Stavins et al., Interpreting Sustainability in 
Economic Terms: Dynamic Efficiency Plus Intergenerational Equity, 79 ECON. LETTERS 339, 340 
(2003). 
 55. Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, Paris, Fr., May 27–28, 2010, 
Interim Report of the Green Growth Strategy: Implementing Our Commitments for a Sustainable 
Future, at 13, OECD Doc. C/MIN(2010)5, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
42/46/45312720.pdf. 
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[is] . . . economic progress that fosters environmentally sustainable, low-
carbon and socially inclusive development,”56 while the United Nations 
Environmental Program defines it similarly as “[the] vision of greener, 
cleaner, low-carbon and resource-efficient economies and societies.”57 Strik-
ing a similar chord, a European Union report defines green growth as 
growth that “results in improved human well-being and social equity, while 
significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities.”58  
Similar language infuses related concepts, such as “green GDP”59 and 
other terms along what might be called the green spectrum,60 including 
concepts like “zero waste,”61 “eco-efficiency,”62 and environmental “decou-
pling.”63 Taken together, all of these ideas point in roughly the same 
direction: toward aspirations of reducing the impact o� human societies  
on the natural environment, for the sake o� both current and future  
                                                                                                                      
 56. U.N. ECON. & SOC. COMM’N FOR ASIA & THE PAC. ET AL., GREEN GROWTH, 
RESOURCES AND RESILIENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 
xv (2012), available at http://www.unescap.org/esd/environment/flagpubs/GGRAP/docume 
nts/Full-Report.pdf. 
 57. U.N. ENVTL. PROGRAMME, ANNUAL REPORT 2009: SEIZING THE GREEN 
OPPORTUNITY 15 (2010), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_2009_ANNUAL_ 
REPORT.pdf. 
 58. Opportunities and Options for Promoting a Green Economy in the Eastern Partnership 
Countries, at 10 (June 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/international 
_issues/pdf/report_green_economy_en.pdf. 
 59. Though standard gross domestic product (GDP) represents the traditional meas-
ure of a state’s economic performance, “green GDP” is an attempt at a more robust figure 
that includes “the positive transactions that benefit well-being and the negative economic 
activities that diminish it.” Jianguo Wu & Tong Wu, Green GDP, in 2 BERKSHIRE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SUSTAINABILITY 248, 248 (2010). For example, costs on economies such 
as pollution and groundwater contamination that are not included within the standard GDP 
figure are accounted for in “green GDP.” Id. at 249. 
 60. The “green spectrum” refers to a range of economic systems and business strate-
gies as characterized by their environmental effects. Allan Johnson, Advisor, World Bank 
Grp., Remarks at the International Regulatory Reform Conference: Better Regulation for 
Green Growth (Mar. 10, 2011). 
 61. “Zero waste” refers to the idea that waste be reconceptualized as a “residual 
product” or “potential resource” to eliminate the acceptance of waste. The Case for Zero 
Waste, ZERO WASTE ALLIANCE, http://www.zerowaste.org/case.htm (last visited May 24, 
2012). 
 62. “Eco-efficiency” refers to the integration of accounts for the outputs of industrial 
production, resulting in increased use of “demanufacturing” and “remanufacturing.” 
STEPHAN SCHMIDHEINY, BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., CHANGING COURSE: A 
GLOBAL BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 9–11 (1992).  
 63. “Decoupling” refers to the aspiration to divorce economic goods from environ-
mental harms. OECD, Indicators to Measure Decoupling of Environmental Pressure from 
Economic Growth, at 4, OECD Doc. SG/SD(2002)1/FINAL (May 16, 2002), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=sg/sd(2002)1/final&docla
nguage=en. 
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generations. Some point more fervently, others emphasize particular sub-
sectors or perspectives, but all share a similar set o� basic goals. 
Yet, despite a great deal of sustainability talk, there are a large number 
of environmental problems that policymakers at the domestic and global 
levels have had substantial difficulty addressing. In addition to the well-
documented threat of climate change,64 there is a large list of other pressing 
environmental concerns, from loss o� biodiversity65 to collapsing fisheries,66 
desertification,67 conventional air and water pollution,68 and forest loss,69 
that have defied solution.  
There are several explanations for why sustainable development goals 
are far more often stated than achieved. The appeal of sustainable develop-
ment, especially as embodied in concrete policy solutions, is far from 
universal. Factual questions about the extent of environmental harm cur-
rently imposed on future generations70 and normative questions about the 
                                                                                                                      
 64. See, e.g., LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007) [hereinafter SYNTHESIS 
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/climate/intro.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
 66. Cornelia Dean, Study Sees ‘Global Collapse’ of Fish Species, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2006, 
at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/03/science/03fish.html?_r=0 (“I� 
fishing around the world continues at its present pace, more and more species will vanish, 
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fished, possibly as soon as midcentury, fisheries experts and ecologists are predicting.”).  
 67. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Expe-
riencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, June 17, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1328, 1332–34 (expressing concern about the impact of desertification and draught 
and acknowledging that the problem is of a global dimension). 
 68. Air pollution and water pollution continue to pose serious risks to the environ-
ment and human health. See generally Air and Radiation: Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/air/basic.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) 
(providing background information on current threats to U.S. air quality); Water Pollution—
Overview, EUR. ENV’T AGENCY, http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/water/water-pollution 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2013).  
 69. Deforestation increases carbon dioxide emissions and creates a severe threat to 
biodiversity. Emerging Issues: Forest Loss, UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM-WIDE EARTHWATCH, 
http://www.un.org/earthwatch/forests/forestloss.html (last updated June 6, 2003). 
 70. For example, the forecasts presented in THE LIMITS TO GROWTH, supra note 13, 
and THE POPULATION BOMB, supra note 14, were heartily disputed by many economists, 
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importance of environmental values compared to other pressing social 
concerns71 or the responsibilities of current generations to the future72 are 
all hotly contested. These controversies may help explain why the definition 
of sustainable development has remained relatively fuzzy over time. 
Even if a suitably clear definition of sustainable development could be 
developed and was largely endorsed as a correct normative aspiration, there 
are institutional difficulties that would hamper its implementation. There 
are substantial barriers to cooperation at the global level, where some policy 
challenges must be addressed. The costs and benefits of climate change, for 
example, are spread unequally across the globe.73 Some regions, such as 
Southeast Asia, are extremely exposed to the negative effects of climate 
change, whereas others, like Russia, may even benefit from mild levels of 
warming.74 In addition, because marginal abatement costs are heterogene-
ous across countries, an efficient carbon pricing policy would result in 
larger emissions reductions in some countries than others. Absent some 
mechanism to compensate the countries with relatively higher costs and 
smaller climate change risks, a unanimous international treaty will be ex-
tremely difficult to form.75 This structure of unequal distribution of costs 
and benefits holds for many forms of global environmental threats. 
Even in a purely domestic context, institutional failures arise. Those in-
terests that are better able to organize to influence the political process are 
more likely to extract favorable policies from democratic governments.76 In 
particular, large, diffuse interests are at a disadvantage against small, con-
centrated interests in overcoming the costs of collective action. This 
dynamic is especially pernicious in the environmental context, where the 
benefits of environmental policies tend to be particularly diffuse because 
                                                                                                                      
who viewed the assumptions and specification in their analyses as “unnecessarily restrictive” 
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 71. See, e.g., GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS (Bjorn Lomborg ed., 2004). 
 72. See Eric A. Posner, Agencies Should Ignore Distant-Future Generations, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 139 (2007). 
 73. See J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners 97 MINN. L. REV. 
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identifying North America, Russia, and Eastern Europe as best off under a range of climate 
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 75. See J. Scott Holladay & Michael Livermore, Regional Variation, Holdouts, and 
Climate Treaty Negotiations, 4 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 1, 131–57 (2013).  
 76. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).  
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the entire population may be negatively affected by pollution, but the costs 
are often limited to particular industrial actors.77  
Where environmental problems have intergenerational consequences, 
the failings o� both global and domestic institutions are even more pro-
nounced. For obvious reasons, future generations have no ability to directly 
influence the current political environment. Elected officials have far 
stronger incentives to respond to the short-term concerns of their existing 
constituents than the long-term future.78 And while those same constituents 
may profess to have the interests o� future generations at heart, voting 
behavior (at least in the United States) is strongly correlated with immedi-
ate economic indicators, like GDP growth.79 
A focus on constraints may, some have argued, also have limited the po-
litical appeal of the concept of sustainable development. For example, 
Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus have argued that environmental 
leaders are guilty of a number of political blunders that diminish their 
ability to succeed in achieving large-scale structural reforms.80 Chief among 
these is a faith that political support for scientifically supported policies will 
be forthcoming even when they challenge widely held norms or could jeop-
ardize current lifestyles.81 These authors argue that an alternative framing 
around the benefits of technological development is needed to generate the 
political will necessary to tackle large-scale environmental problems like 
climate change.82 
To the extent that “green growth” amounts to a way to restate aspira-
tions associated with sustainable development, it will be subject to the same 
political and rhetorical limitations that have hampered the appeal of sus-
                                                                                                                      
 77. See Gabrielle Cuskelly, Factors to Consider in Applying a Presumption Against Preemp-
tion to State Environmental Regulations, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 283, 319 (2012) (“While industry 
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10 (2004), available at http://www.thebreakthrough.org/images/Death_of_Environmentalism.pdf. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 26–28. 
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tainability within national and international policymaking. While embody-
ing what may be a laudable, and perhaps even morally compelling, policy 
goal, its influence on actual decisionmaking by governments subject to 
political constraints may be limited absent substantial institutional change. 
Indeed, discourse around green growth tends to deemphasize the con-
straints created by sustainability, perhaps in response to these practical and 
political concerns. If there is a common thread that links discussions of 
green growth, it is an emphasis on ways in which environmental quality 
improvements can be compatible with economic growth, rather than on the 
constraints of either economic growth or environmental quality on the 
other.83 In this way, focus is taken away from the importance o� limits to 
growth and is instead placed on “the private green innovation machine,”84 a 
prospect that is more rhetorically appealing and avoids debates about envi-
ronmental constraints on growth. But for this rhetorical move to be more 
than rebranding of an old concept, the content of green growth must also 
differ in some important substantive way that improves its chances o� being 
implemented in domestic policymaking.  
II. GREEN GROWTH AS ENVIRONMENTAL COST-EFFECTIVENESS  
The following part develops the concept of the green growth frontier. 
The first section discusses how standard economic models of environmental 
problems focus on tradeoffs that must be made between environmental 
quality and other economic goods. The second examines the deficiencies of 
certain claims associated with green growth rhetoric concerning the rela-
tionship between economic growth and environmental quality. The third 
section focuses on the concept of effectiveness, as applied to environmental 
and economic policy, and argues that the most useful definition of green 
growth is one that recognizes the existence of tradeoffs but encourages 
policymakers to make those tradeoffs along the frontier where all opportu-
nities for policies that benefit both the environment and economic growth 
have been exhausted. 
A. Standard Economic Models of Environmental Policy 
Underlying the standard economic theory of environmental policy is 
the fundamental concept of scarcity. In the environmental context, scarcity 
implies that, in a world o� finite resources, the provision o� higher levels of 
environmental quality (like clean air and water, climate stability, and pro-
tected natural habitats) implies less provision of other goods, such as 
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POL’Y BRIEF, Nov. 2009, at 6. 
 84. Id.  
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electricity, lumber, or industrial solvents. Following standard economic 
theory, private transactions will generate a set of optimal production and 
allocation decisions, so long as market failures do not interfere. Optimality, 
in this framework, is defined according to the Pareto-efficiency criteria, 
according to which no person can be made better off while leaving every 
other person at least as well off. When Pareto-efficiency is met, any im-
provement in any person’s well-being must come at the expense of some 
other person.85 
Economists have long recognized that markets do not always work per-
fectly and that real-world market equilibriums may not be optimal. Market 
failures can arise in a variety of contexts related to environmental protec-
tion. Some environmental amenities are public goods, meaning that there is 
very little incentive for private actors to provide them.86 For example, in 
the case of climate stability, if a company were to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions, there would be no way for it to charge the beneficiaries: climate 
stability is non-excludable. Though the benefit of the emissions reduction 
may be higher than the costs, the company cannot recoup its investment, 
absent some policy mechanisms. 
This same issue can be stated differently as one of externalities. An ex-
ternality is an effect of a private exchange that is felt by third parties who 
are prevented, for whatever reason, from bargaining with the primary par-
ties.87 In the case of climate stability, the burning o� fossil fuels for 
electricity generates negative effects (such as increased exposure to 
droughts due to climate change) and there are barriers that prevent the 
third parties exposed to those effects (future generations) from bargaining 
with the primary parties (electricity sellers and buyers).  
The purpose of public policy in this framework is to correct for market 
failures and allow the economy to generate maximum economic value given 
finite resources.88 The standard tool for evaluating policy is cost-benefit 
analysis, which seeks to estimate and compare the costs and benefits of a 
government intervention. Typically, cost-benefit analysis employs the po-
tential-Pareto test, which asks whether the beneficiaries of the intervention 
could, in theory, compensate those burdened by the policy. For example, if 
an air quality rule imposes $10 million in compliance costs on industry but 
                                                                                                                      
 85. See CENTO VELJANOVSKI, THE ECONOMICS OF LAW 65 (2d ed. 2006). 
 86. See generally Geoffrey Heal, New Strategies for the Provision of Global Public Goods, in 
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 220, 220, 222–23 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999) (describing public 
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 87. See VELJANOVSKI, supra note 85, at 95. 
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reduces health costs valued at $20 million by local residents, then the rule 
passes the potential-Pareto test (otherwise known as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).89 
Some degree of environmental protection is compatible, then, with 
economic well-being. Government intervention in the environmental arena 
is necessary to maximize overall economic well-being in the face of market 
failures. These government interventions are efficient if they maximize net 
benefits and are less than efficient if they fail to do so. 
On the basis of the discussion above, it is clear that the maximization of 
net economic benefits implies a positive level of protection for valuable 
environmental amenities. In the case of climate change, the costs associated 
with the failure to control greenhouse gas emissions may be very high. 
Scientists predict a number of negative effects from global warming and 
climate instability, including rising sea levels, severe weather, and threats to 
agriculture and fisheries.90 Emissions controls, while potentially costly, 
reduce those risks, so some level of mitigation is economically worthwhile. 
This framework, which views environmental policy at least partially 
through the lens of the maximization of net economic benefits, has been 
embodied in a number of domestic policy settings. Cost-benefit analysis has 
been central to the U.S. regulatory system since 1981, when President 
Reagan directed all federal agencies to use this analysis prior to adopting 
new regulations.91 While succeeding presidents have tinkered with the 
regulatory review policy, the commitment to cost-benefit analysis has re-
mained remarkably consistent.92 In Europe, the most prominent example of 
institutional cost-benefit analysis is the European Union’s Better Regulation 
initiative, which the European Commission has been in the process of 
implementing since 2002. An important component of the Better Regula-
tion program is a requirement that regulatory impact analyses be performed 
for all commission “initiatives which are likely to have a significant im-
pact.”93 The purpose of the impact assessments is to “analyse both benefits 
and costs, and address in a balanced way all the significant economic, social 
and environmental impacts of . . . possible initiatives.”94  
It is important to note that this classic economic framework recognizes 
that there is a fundamental tradeof� between environmental quality and 
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other types of consumption. In this view, better environmental quality 
means less of something else. The goal is to arrive at the optimal balance of 
environmental quality and other goods. Of course, if the tradeoffs between 
environmental quality and other goods change—for example, if the cost of 
emissions reductions falls—then that will affect the level of protection that 
would be justified by cost-benefit analysis. But the overall framework ap-
plies whether the costs of controlling environmental impacts are low or 
high. 
This standard framework evaluates environmental regulation through 
the lens of preference-maximization. The basic question is, given a set of 
productive capacities and preferences, how should resources be allocated to 
maximize utility, as measured by individual preferences? Effects on eco-
nomic growth, employment, and international competitiveness are 
secondary, and are considered through their contribution to preference 
satisfaction.95 Accounting for these second-order effects can have important 
consequences for estimating regulatory effects.96 For developing countries 
especially, negative effects on economic growth or employment could out-
weigh even substantial gains in environmental quality. At the same time, 
predicting how environmental regulations will affect these outcomes is 
difficult, with studies often generating conflicting results.97  
The standard environmental economics framework can be of some use-
fulness for refining the concept of green growth, but may not be able to 
provide a full definition. It is possible to define green growth as policy that 
maximizes the net benefits of economic activity, considering the full range 
of impacts of that activity on human well-being. This approach would 
equate mainstream cost-benefit analysis with green growth. But, as with 
sustainable development, the concept of green growth would lose any inde-
pendent meaning, and it would also abandon the development orientation 
implied by the concept’s focus on growth.  
A more limited overlap between environmental economics and green 
growth situates the concept within the broader set of insights of environ-
mental economics: policy involves tradeoffs, environmental goods have 
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important value (which can be expressed in economic terms), and balancing 
competing considerations is at the heart of public policy. In this way, the 
“growth” component of green growth is not abandoned, and there remains 
potential for green growth to take on some independent meaning.  
B. Green Growth’s Weakness as a Descriptive Account 
One of the defining characteristics of green growth discourse is a set of 
claims about the compatibility of environmental policy and economic 
growth. The claims associated with discussions of green growth can be 
divided roughly into two categories: 
Macroeconomic Claims: Investment in environmental protection can 
achieve effective macroeconomic stimulus during business cycle 
downturns. Environmental policy can increase demand for local la-
bor and reduce unemployment in developed countries. 
No Tradeoff Claims: Environmental policy can achieve environmen-
tal goals with low, or even negative, economic costs, through 
productivity growth and technological innovation.  
Each of these claims has been put forward by a range of supporters, in-
cluding analysts, civil society organizations, and governmental actors,98 but 
each has also drawn a number of detractors.99 Ultimately, the shortcomings 
of these empirical claims about growth and environmental quality argue in 
favor of an interpretation of green growth that is more normative instead of 
descriptive. Rather than a positive account of the way the world is, green 
growth is better understood as providing a normatively desirable set of 
goals for policymakers, the contours of which are discussed further below. 
1. Macroeconomic Claims  
The concept of green growth has been closely associated with “green 
jobs” programs, especially those initiated in the wake of the 2008 global 
recession. These types of programs rely on Keynesian and neo-Keynesian 
                                                                                                                      
 98. See, e.g., Michael Faure et al., Bucking the Kuznets Curve: Designing Effective Envi-
ronmental Regulation in Developing Countries, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 95, 98 (2010) (asserting that 
there is a clear link between environmental performance and economic vitality); Michael E. 
Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness 
Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 101–04 (1995) (citing examples where corporations elimi-
nated costly materials and redesigned products to reduce costs in response to environmental 
regulation).  
 99. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 156 (Henry M. 
Peskin et al. eds., 1981) (finding a “small but perceptible and generally adverse effect on 
price level, economic growth, productivity, international trade, and an ambiguous effect on 
employment” due to environmental regulation). 
     
54 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 3:1 
macroeconomic models, which envision a strong role for government in 
reducing the negative effects of the business cycle.  
In Keynes-based macroeconomic models, lags in aggregate demand re-
sult in underutilization of productive resources, including labor, causing 
increased unemployment during times of economic downturn.100 In the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis during the late 2000s, central banks 
and governments worldwide engaged in a series of policies, based largely on 
recommendations generated by Keynesian macroeconomic models, to stim-
ulate their economies through monetary and fiscal policy. For several major 
global economies, at least some portion of the fiscal stimulus packages 
enacted by governments included infrastructure or other projects that were 
designed to have environmentally beneficial results. Within the three larg-
est economic zones—the European Union, the United States, and China—
roughly $330 billion in stimulus spending was directed to putatively green 
projects.101  
Because environmental protection generates social benefits, green pro-
jects undertaken as part of stimulus programs may be economically 
beneficial regardless of the prevailing macroeconomic conditions. These net 
beneficial projects represent wise economic investments, even were they not 
to lead to demand stimulus. Investing in environmental projects as part of 
stimulus packages, then, can amount to a hedge that ensures social benefits 
from the spending, regardless of the macroeconomic effects.102 
Indeed, spending on environmental infrastructure during a time of 
economic downturn can be justified according to fairly straightforward 
economic reasoning. During times of economic downturn, unemployment 
typically increases. The larger pool of unemployed, underutilized workers, 
which places downward pressure on wages, creates opportunities for labor-
intensive projects. Even if wages are slow to respond to new economic 
conditions, the social opportunity costs of employing underutilized labor is 
small.103 Because environmental projects, such as green infrastructure de-
velopment, often rely on local labor, a period of economic recession 
represents an opportunity for government to maximize the economic value 
of its investment by taking advantage o� favorable wage conditions. Regard-
less of stimulus effects, governments therefore have incentives to use lulls 
in the business cycle to maximize the social value for a given expenditure on 
                                                                                                                      
 100. See, e.g., Marc Nerlove, Notes on the Production and Derived Demand Relations 
Included in Macro-Econometric Models, 8 INT’L ECON. REV. 223, 224 (1967). 
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 103. See Michael A. Livermore & Jason A. Schwartz, Analysis to Inform Public Discourse 
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eds., 2013). 
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labor inputs. Many green projects are good candidates for this type of 
spending because they are temporary—like infrastructure construction—
and can be started up and wound down within relatively short time periods. 
They often also create benefits over long periods, so the value of the pro-
jects is largely unaffected by the point in the business cycle in which they 
are begun. Projects with long-term payoffs that would be marginally net 
beneficial during an economic boom will be much more profitable during 
economic downturns, when labor costs are lower. 
There are several related green growth claims having to do with envi-
ronmental protection and employment. One is that improvements in 
energy efficiency can result in increased labor demand. In the short term, 
energy efficiency policies would increase labor demand for various retrofit-
ting and weatherization projects that firms would be required to 
undertake.104 These projects must be accomplished by on-site domestic 
labor and cannot be outsourced overseas.105 Over the long term, by reducing 
the cost of energy, energy efficiency programs create an income effect that 
increases consumer spending.106 Engel and Kammen argue that improved 
energy efficiency will free up capital that would have otherwise been spent 
on energy costs. The effect could be to expand resources that are available 
to hire additional labor.107 According to David Roland-Holst, energy effi-
ciency programs have created more than one million jobs in California 
alone since 1972.108  
These claims are controversial. Some critics argue that the labor de-
mand increases from green growth initiatives are either exaggerated109 or 
completely offset by the number of jobs that are lost or shifted by these 
                                                                                                                      
 104. See VAN JONES, THE GREEN COLLAR ECONOMY: HOW ONE SOLUTION CAN FIX 
OUR TWO BIGGEST PROBLEMS 8–11 (2008); see also Thomas L. Friedman, The Green-Collar 
Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, at A27. 
 105. JONES, supra note 104, at 13. See generally ROBERT POLLIN ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, GREEN RECOVERY: A PROGRAM TO CREATE GOOD JOBS AND START BUILDING 
A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY (2008), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ 
2008/09/pdf/green_recovery.pdf. 
 106. JAMIE HOWLAND ET AL., ENVIRONMENT NE., ENERGY EFFICIENCY: ENGINE OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 3–5 (2009); DAVID ROLAND-HOLST, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY, INNOVATION, AND JOB CREATION IN CALIFORNIA 26–29 (2008), 
available at http://are.berkeley.edu/~dwrh/CERES_Web/Docs/UCB%20Energy%20Innov 
ation%20and%20Job%20Creation%2010-20-08.pdf. 
 107. Ditlev Engel & Daniel M. Kammen, Green Jobs and the Clean Energy Economy 
(Copenhagen Climate Council Thought Leadership Ser. No. 4, 2009), available at 
http://climatechange.ca.gov/eaac/documents/member_materials/Engel_and_Kammen_Green
_Jobs_and_the_Clean_Energy_Economy.pdf. 
 108. ROLAND-HOLST, supra note 106, at 10. 
 109. Sunil Sharan, Op-Ed., The Green Jobs Myth, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2010), available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022503945.html. 
     
56 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 3:1 
policies.110 Others question whether government expenditure in these areas 
could be better spent on other private ventures or if governments are capa-
ble of successfully implementing such a wide-scale initiative.111 A more 
basic criticism is that dealing with two complex issues—unemployment and 
environmental protection—with one policy initiative is likely to miss the 
mark on both objectives.112  
2. Low (or No) Cost Claims 
A second green growth claim is that environmental policy can impose 
very low, or even negative, costs on industry. This claim is crystallized in 
the Porter hypothesis, according to which environmental regulations can 
induce more efficient production processes that actually increase productiv-
ity, putting aside environmental considerations.113 These efficiencies are 
achieved when business managers are spurred to reevaluate production 
processes and rethink how best to utilize labor and capital inputs in addi-
tion to reducing environmental footprints. If this is the case, compliance 
with environmental goals can be achieved at zero, or even negative costs.114 
The Porter hypothesis has been criticized on both theoretical and em-
pirical grounds. From a theoretical perspective, some economists are 
uncomfortable with the Porter hypothesis’s claim that profit maximizing 
firms fail to take advantage of productivity increasing innovations, which 
seems to conflict with economic rationality.115 Empirically, there is a great 
deal of controversy over whether environmental rules tend to reduce or 
increase productivity, with studies finding effects in opposite directions.116 
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It is worth noting that even if the Porter hypothesis holds in some cas-
es, so that firms, in the course of complying with a new environmental 
regulation, discover a production process improvement that increases 
productivity, it does not necessarily indicate that the environmental regula-
tion resulted in an efficient inducement of technological change. It is quite 
possible that, economy wide, there are many undiscovered opportunities for 
process improvements that have not been found because the search costs are 
not justified. This would be the case if the probability of discovery multi-
plied by the benefit of the discovery, minus the search costs, is negative. If 
the environmental rule induces the search nonetheless, then it would not be 
an efficient discovery unless some market inefficiency, such as the public 
good nature of information,117 inhibited optimal investment in investiga-
tion.  
A more expansive version of the no-tradeoff claim is that improving 
environmental performance can generate growth in traditional measures of 
economic productivity such as per capita GDP. According to this genera-
tive hypothesis, economic performance and environmental amenities are 
not truly scarce, in the standard sense, and instead can be mutually rein-
forcing. 
There are several sources for this generative hypothesis. Some thinkers 
in endogenous growth theory postulate that investment in environmental 
quality can produce “productivity effects” that produce economic benefits 
in the form of increased environmental services, “but also productivity o� 
human capital and other man-made assets [that] might increase through 
health effects or less physical depreciation.”118 In a recent retrospective 
analysis of certain environmental programs under the Clean Air Act, the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) attempted to in-
clude some of the productivity gains associated with environmental 
protection by modeling the macroeconomic effects of increased worker 
productivity from fewer work days lost from sickness.119 By incorporating 
these effects into macroeconomic models, the EPA found that the GDP 
growth costs associated with the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act 
(the centerpiece of which was a cap-and-trade program to control acid rain 
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pollution) were substantially lower than a “cost only” model that did not 
take those productivity gains into account.120 
Energy efficiency is another area where productivity growth and envi-
ronmental quality have been viewed as mutually reinforcing. In a 
comprehensive review of the U.S. economy that focused on opportunities 
to abate greenhouse gas emissions, the consulting firm McKinsey & Co. 
found that there are a number of energy efficiency technologies that could 
be implemented at zero or negative marginal costs.121 For any number o� 
hypothesized reasons, from information failure to high, context-specific 
discount rates, there appears to be systematic underinvestment in energy 
efficiency technology.122 Efficiency rules, then, could produce both econom-
ic and environmental benefits. 
Alternatively, commentators have argued that although investment in 
energy efficiency may produce productivity benefits, it is unlikely to im-
prove environmental quality because of a phenomenon referred to as the 
“rebound effect.”123 The rebound effect assumes that because energy 
productivity improvements reduce the price and increase the supply of 
energy, these improvements will inevitably lead to economic growth and 
new uses for energy.124 The result is greater consumption of energy than 
would exist absent the productivity improvements.125  
To summarize, the descriptive hypotheses associated with green 
growth—that environmental investment can serve as effective economic 
macroeconomic or employment stimulus, or that environmental quality 
goals can be achieved at zero or negative costs—are deeply controversial. If 
green growth is understood as only embodying these descriptive claims, it is 
subject to substantial contestation and, as an empirical matter, may ulti-
                                                                                                                      
 120. Id. at 23–25. 
 121. MCKINSEY & CO., REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: HOW MUCH 
AT WHAT COST? ix–xiii (2007), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/Client_Service/Susta 
inability/Latest_thinking/Reducing_US_greenhouse_gas_emissions. 
 122. WILLIAM PRINDLE, NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY AS A LOW-COST RESOURCE FOR ACHIEVING CARBON EMISSIONS 
REDUCTIONS 1-1 (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/suca 
/ee_and_carbon.pdf (noting that while “[s]avings from reduced energy consumption typical-
ly outweigh the cost of the energy efficiency investment,” increased energy costs are 
insufficient to incentivize investment in efficiency due to regulatory and market barriers). 
 123. See JESSE JENKINS ET AL., BREAKTHROUGH INST., ENERGY EMERGENCE: 
REBOUND & BACKFIRE AS EMERGENT PHENOMENA 4 (2011), available at 
http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/Energy_Emergence.pdf.  
 124. Id. 
 125. For some empirical studies on the rebound effect see G. ALLAN ET AL., THE 
MACROECONOMIC REBOUND EFFECT AND THE UK ECONOMY (2006); David L. Greene, 
James R. Kahn & Robert C. Gibson, Fuel Economy Rebound Effect for U.S. Household Vehicles, 
20 ENERGY J. 1 (1999); Joyashree Roy, The Rebound Effect: Some Empirical Evidence from India, 
28 ENERGY POL’Y 433 (2000). 
     
Fall 2013] The Meaning of Green Growth 59 
mately be proven incorrect. It also lacks any substantive meaning beyond a 
general (and potentially unjustified) optimism concerning the economic 
consequences of environmental protection.  
A more productive and useful definition of green growth would steer 
clear of these descriptive claims and instead focus on a normative agenda of 
improved governmental decisionmaking in the environmental area. That is 
the focus of the following section. 
C. The Green Growth Frontier as a Normative Goal 
Discussion around green growth can be understood as a reaction, to 
some degree, against the focus within both sustainability discourse and 
traditional environmental economics on the conflict between environmental 
quality and economic goals. While it is important not to attempt to wish 
this conflict away, as sometimes occurs when green growth is taken as a 
descriptive account of the world, it is also important to recognize that there 
are policy choices that governments can make to help reduce that conflict. 
These policies should be widely adopted in a range of development and 
political contexts. Certainly, there are hard, perhaps even “tragic” choices126 
that must sometimes be made between economic and environmental goals. 
But these hard choices can sometimes overshadow the easy ones where 
policy choices dominate across both domains. 
Over the past several decades, a substantial empirical and theoretical 
literature has been developed on instrument choice and the cost-
effectiveness of different forms of environmental policy.127 In particular, 
market-based mechanisms, like pollution taxes and cap-and-trade systems, 
have been identified as achieving environmental goals at the lowest possible 
costs.128 These findings, which are substantially less controversial than the 
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Porter hypothesis and have achieved wide acceptance within the economics 
community,129 do not go as far, but nevertheless point to ways that envi-
ronmental and economic goals can be made more compatible. 
A corollary to this literature examines how the design of government 
policy can affect innovation and technological development, which in turn 
affect the compliance costs associated with environmental protection.130 
Government policy that gives firms both flexibility in how environmental 
outcomes are achieved and incentives to continually reduce pollution can 
help spur development o� lower-cost compliance mechanisms. This princi-
ple continues to serve as one of the primary justifications for market 
mechanisms, because these types of policies are viewed as best establishing 
the conditions for beneficial technological development.131  
Environmental taxes and fees in particular have spurred excitement, 
both for the flexibility they give market actors and for the potential double 
dividend created when revenues generated by these instruments can be 
used to reduce other, more economically distortionary taxes.132 Because the 
mechanisms used by governments to raise revenue—including income 
taxes, value added taxes, corporate taxes, capital gains taxes, sales taxes, and 
property taxes—all tend to distort incentives and reduce overall economic 
productivity, environmental taxes, where they replace taxes with greater 
distorting effects, can improve economic performance. The double dividend 
occurs when both productivity and environmental outcomes are improved.133 
While flexible market mechanisms hold great promise, they should not 
be viewed as a panacea, or necessarily appropriate in every context. Markets 
require fungible commodities as their basis and enforcement infrastructure 
(often with sophisticated monitoring capacity) to ensure compliance. They 
are sometimes subject to manipulation and they benefit from the interac-
tion of sophisticated parties engaging in arm’s length transactions. In some 
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contexts, these conditions might not be met. For example, markets to facili-
tate trading concerning effluent limitations for water bodies are notoriously 
difficult to build because of the limited fungibility of pollutants, the rela-
tively small number of actors, and the difficulty of monitoring non-source 
pollution, which is a major contributor.134 On the other hand, markets for 
emissions allowances for certain types of air pollutants have proved to be 
very successful, because the markets are thick, populated by sophisticated 
actors, and involve a (relatively) fungible commodity.135  
Even where full-fledged market mechanisms are not feasible, govern-
ments have a wide variety of policy options that help reduce compliance 
costs, from allowing for flexible, performance-based standards to reducing 
permitting and paperwork burdens. Overall, the goal of achieving environ-
mental quality goals at the lowest possible cost is standard fare in policy 
analysis and is generally referred to as “cost-effectiveness analysis.”136 When 
analysts examine the costs per ton of greenhouse gas reduction137 or per 
year of additional life expectancy138 of a policy, these are essentially cost-
effectiveness analyses. While cost-effectiveness does not provide a complete 
answer for a policy choice, the goal of the analysis to identify lowest-cost 
approaches is uncontroversial.  
Cost-effectiveness analysis has generally focused on reducing the com-
pliance burden associated with protecting other social goals like public 
health or the environment. But the mirror image of this economic cost-
effectiveness analysis is environmental cost-effectiveness analysis, which 
seeks to reduce the burden placed on natural resources, ecosystems, or 
environmental health by policies that are designed to achieve economic 
goals. This type of analysis would take as a given some economic goal, 
perhaps associated with employment or productivity growth, and then seek 
to attain that goal in the most environmentally friendly manner. Indeed, 
the same policies that pass the economic cost-effectiveness test will pass the 
environmental cost-effectiveness test as well because they involve minimiz-
ing the rate of the tradeof� between the two goods. The difference is in the 
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starting point—whether the given is a particular level of environmental 
protection or an economic goal. 
For example, pollution taxes are an extremely cost-effective way to 
achieve environmental goals because complying firms are given flexibility to 
achieve low-cost reductions. In a system where firms compete and are capa-
ble of innovation, this will lead to the lowest possible compliance costs per 
unit of pollution reduction. At the same time, pollution taxes can be an 
extremely environmentally effective way to achieve economic goals, like 
funding infrastructure or education. Revenue for government expenditures 
on these goods will need to be raised one way or another—selecting a pollu-
tion tax as a revenue-raising device achieves the government’s economic 
goals o� funding public goods while improving environmental quality. Pol-
lution taxes are effective, then, from both an environmental and economic 
perspective.139  
Cost- and environmental-effectiveness analyses do not provide guid-
ance on the correct tax rate. Either an environmental or an economic goal 
must precede the analysis. For example, if a given level of permissible risk 
from particulate matter pollution is selected, the tax can be set to generate 
that risk at the lowest social cost. Alternatively, if a given amount of tax 
revenue is needed for public goods, the tax rate can be set to reach those 
revenue goals. 
There are many ways that environmental or economic goals could be 
set. In the United States, the EPA is required to set ambient air pollution 
limits at levels that are sufficient to protect public health, with “an adequate 
margin of safety.”140 Public revenue requirements are set with reference to 
necessary public goods like national defense.141 Developing countries may 
have very specific economic growth targets for poverty reduction.142 Cost-
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benefit analysis recommends maximizing preference satisfaction.143 Howev-
er economic or environmental goals are set, the purpose of effectiveness 
analysis is to achieve those goals in the least costly manner.  
FIGURE 1 
The green growth agenda, as illustrated in Figure 1, can be interpreted 
as encouraging government to make policy at the frontier where all possible 
policies have been selected that generate benefits along at least one dimen-
sion without causing costs in the other. This may sound like an unambitious 
agenda, and indeed it may be. But even though, in the aggregate, economic 
goals are met, green growth policies may nonetheless impose costs on par-
ticularly powerful economic actors, in which case controversy is likely to 
follow. Ideological commitments, divorced from economic incentives, may 
also pose challenges to adoption of green growth policies. 
Recent history in the United States provides ample examples of oppo-
sition to green growth policies. For instance, in 2011, the EPA proposed a 
rule to address air pollution that travels between states, referred to as the 
Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR).144 The rule relied heavily on 
market mechanisms to achieve pollution reductions, providing industry a 
high degree o� flexibility to achieve low-cost reduction in air pollution. The 
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largest category o� benefits associated with the rule was life savings from 
reductions in particulate matter exposure. The agency estimated benefits 
from the rule at between $110 billion and more than $280 billion per year, 
with costs of under $1 billion.145 Modeling of the rule by the agency found, 
in essence, that there would be negligible positive effects on employment.146 
The rule was heavily justified on cost-benefit grounds, and seemed to 
promote green growth by achieving environmental benefits with no nega-
tive consequences for broad economic goals, but opposition was  
nevertheless stiff. Regulated industry was expected to face costs that had 
the potential to cause the reallocation of capital and displacement of work-
ers.147 Even though, on net, the rule did not sacrifice economic goals, there 
were distributional consequences that affected parties were unwilling to 
bear without a fight. 
Many members of the Republican Party in the U.S. Congress proved a 
receptive audience for opponents of the rule. Republican members of the 
U.S. Senate forced a floor vote on a resolution under the Congressional 
Review Act to overturn the rule, gaining 41 votes.148 Ultimately, the rule 
was challenged in court by regulated industry groups, as well as several 
states, including Texas. On August 21, 2012, a panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the EPA had over-
stepped its statutory authorization under the Clean Air Act by adopting 
exactly those flexible, cost-effective market mechanisms that most promote 
green growth.149 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari for that case,150 
                                                                                                                      
 145. OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FEDERAL IMPLEMENTATION PLANS TO REDUCE INTERSTATE 
TRANSPORT OF FINE PARTICULATE MATTER AND OZONE IN 27 STATES; CORRECTION OF 
SIP APPROVALS FOR 22 STATES, at 2 tbl.1-1 (2011).  
 146. Id. at 16 tbl.1-6. 
 147. Economic modeling done by representatives of regulated industry of CSAPR and 
a contemporaneous air pollution rule proposed by EPA to address mercury emission found 
that more than a million job losses would occur as the result of the rules, while similar 
modeling done by progressive defenders of the rule found similar levels of employment 
gains. Livermore & Schwartz, supra note 103, at 247. Although there are good reasons to 
doubt the accuracy of these estimates, it is very plausible that the rulemaking resulted in the 
reallocation o� labor while having very little effect on overall employment. These competing 
analyses nicely demonstrate both how net effects on economic variables can hide important 
distributional consequences and how susceptible economic modeling can be to advocacy 
posturing. See generally id. 
 148. Halimah Abdullah, Senate Defeats Rand Paul’s Bid to Curb EPA Rules on Power Plant 
Emissions, KENTUCKY.COM, (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.kentucky.com/2011/11/11/1954707/ 
senate-defeats-rand-pauls-bid.html. The Congressional Review Act requires a federal agency 
promulgating a rule to submit to each house of Congress a report containing a copy of the 
rule, a concise general statement relating to the rule, and the proposed effective date of the 
rule. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A) (2012). If Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval as 
described in § 802 of the Act, the rule does not take effect. § 801(g). 
 149. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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but whatever the ultimate resolution, CSAPR provides an illustrative case 
study o� how intransigent opposition can slow or even derail green growth 
policies. 
There are many cases of more purely ideological opposition to green 
growth policies as well. For example, as part o� budget negotiations be-
tween President Barack Obama and the Republican House o� 
Representatives in 2011, a major priority for the House was a provision to 
suspend enforcement of a 2007 law to encourage more energy-efficient 
lighting. Representative Michael Burgess was quoted at the time as saying, 
“When the American people gave Republicans control of the House in 
January, one of the major issues involved was the Democratic ban on the 
100 watt bulb.”151 The House was ultimately successful in inserting this 
provision into the final budget.152 Opposition to this green growth policy, 
which would have generated environmental benefits along with net savings 
for consumers, is hard to fathom except as a purely ideological exercise: the 
2007 law in question was, in fact, signed by Republican president George 
W. Bush with broad, bipartisan majorities in both houses of Congress, and 
regulated industry supports enforcement of the requirements.153 
Nor is opposition to green growth policies limited to one side of the 
political spectrum. Market mechanisms to reduce pollution remain contro-
versial within a substantial segment of the environmental community. A 
recent high-profile example of opposition to market mechanisms occurred 
in California, when environmental justice groups protested the adoption of 
a cap-and-trade approach to limiting greenhouse gas emissions.154 These 
groups preferred command-and-control style regulations that would have 
required more uniform emission reduction, even though they would have 
been more expensive and would have resulted in the same climate impact. 
The effort to stop California from adopting a cap-and-trade system was 
ultimately unsuccessful, but it shows that green growth policies can stir 
opposition for a diverse set of political actors. 
                                                                                                                      
 150. Am. Lung Ass’n v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013). 
 151. Stephen Dinan, Congress Overturns Incandescent Light Bulb Ban, WASH. TIMES 
(Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/16/congress-overturns-
incandescent-light-bulb-ban. 
 152. Lori Robertson, Refereeing the Republic Response, FACTCHECK.ORG (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://www.factcheck.org/2012/01/refereeing-the-republican-response/.  
 153. Id. 
 154. See Madeline Ostrander, Is Cap and Trade Fair?, THE NATION, Apr. 8, 2013, at 28. 
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FIGURE 2  
Figure 2 illustrates two additional elements of the green growth agen-
da. In the left panel, Countries A, B, and C will have different rates at 
which they are willing to trade environmental quality against economic 
goals. By selecting the point along the green growth frontier that corre-
sponds to its preferred marginal rate of substitution between the two 
dimensions, each country can maximize its well-being. This rate of substitu-
tion is likely related to the level of development that a country has 
achieved; in this figure, Country A is likely the most economically ad-
vanced, while Country C would be the least developed. A rate of 
substitution can also be inferred in instances where policymakers set an 
absolute goal, such as achieving a given level of growth, and then work 
toward that goal along the green growth frontier. In the figure above, if 
Country B set some absolute economic goal, the rate of substitution could 
be inferred.  
Green growth policies may also seek to push the frontier outward, as il-
lustrated in the right panel. This is possible through technological 
development. The effectiveness frontier, which defines the most efficient 
possible tradeoffs between environmental and economic goals, is deter-
mined by the existing state of technology. As innovation occurs, that 
frontier can be moved. For example, reductions in greenhouse gases, no 
matter how efficient the government policy, will result in a certain level of 
economic costs. If radical new energy storage technology is developed, that 
cost would be substantially lower. The effect is to push the green growth 
frontier out by reducing the cost of environmental protection. Because 
technology itself is the result of government policy, it is sensible for the 
green growth agenda to focus on facilitating certain types of technological 
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growth. At the very minimum, the green growth agenda would include 
ensuring that the incentives for the development of technologies that push 
the effectiveness frontier outward are not undermined by externalized 
social costs or innovation spillover effects. For societies that are willing to 
make an additional investment in moving the green growth frontier out-
ward, subsidies for technological development would be appropriate.  
III. THE GREEN GROWTH AGENDA 
Achieving green growth, as defined above, requires that the conflict be-
tween environmental and economic goals be reduced to the absolute 
minimum. To achieve this, government decisionmakers will need to identify 
regulatory tools that involve the most favorable tradeof� between cost and 
benefits. 
Over the past several decades, reform movements in both the United 
States and Europe have focused on a very similar set of issues. Experience 
from these attempts to improve regulatory quality offers important insights 
into how the green growth agenda can be implemented in practice. 
A. Growth of What? 
One question that can be asked when defining the green growth agenda 
is: Growth of what? Put another way, the appropriate measure of economic 
progress may itsel� be subject to scrutiny under the green growth lens.  
Traditionally, aggregate production, and in particular the metric of 
GDP, has been the yardstick by which economic progress has been meas-
ured.155 There are a number of well-known shortcomings of GDP as the 
measure of growth for setting social policy.156 Among the many factors 
significantly affecting well-being that are not adequately captured by GDP 
are environmental quality, education, health, and leisure time.157 Measures 
other than consumption, even broadly construed, may better track well-
being.158 One of the most persistently noted problems of GDP as a measure 
                                                                                                                      
 155. The GDP measure was developed in the United States by Simon Kuznets and his 
colleges at the National Bureau o� Economic Research during the 1930s as a way to provide 
policymakers with guidance on the extent of the effect of the Great Depression on the 
American economy. See Simon Kuznets, National Income, 1929–1932, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. 
RES., June 7, 1934, at 1, available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2258.pdf. 
 156. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, AMARTYA SEN & JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI, MISMEASURING 
OUR LIVES: WHY GDP DOESN’T ADD UP (2010); OMB REPORT, supra note 97, at 42–43; 
see also SIMON KUZNETS ET AL., NATIONAL INCOME AND ITS COMPOSITION, 1919–1938, at 
3–60 (1941). 
 157. OMB REPORT, supra note 97, at 42–44; Daniel Kahneman et al., Toward National 
Well-Being Accounts, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 429, 430 (leisure time). 
 158. An alternative, National Time Accounting, measures day-to-day well-being using 
what is called the Day Reconstruction Method. See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger et al., National 
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of well-being is its insensitivity to the distribution of consumption.159 Dis-
tribution matters to well-being because of the diminishing marginal utility 
of consumption.160  
If the relevant economic variable to be maximized through public poli-
cy is understood to be well-being rather than aggregate consumption, 
policies that effectuate the redistribution of wealth may promote green 
growth: to the extent that low-utility consumption o� luxury goods can be 
replaced by high-utility consumption o� basic goods, there is growth in 
social well-being without increased environmental burden. This policy 
recommendation, however, may be controversial in some societies.161  
Others have questioned the link between consumption and subjective 
well-being even at the individual level.162 Richard Easterlin has observed 
that “at a point in time both among and within nations, happiness varies 
directly with income, but over time, happiness does not increase when a 
country’s income increases.”163 The Easterlin paradox is related to, and can 
                                                                                                                      
Time Accounting: The Currency of Life, in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF 
NATIONS: NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF TIME USE AND WELL-BEING 9 (Alan B. Krueger ed., 
2009). 
 159. See, e.g., Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1, 27 (1955) (“Without better knowledge of the trends in secular income structure [i.e. 
distribution of income] and of the factors that determine them, our understanding of the 
whole process of economic growth is limited.”). 
 160. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 961 (Douglas Greenwald ed., 1982) (discussing 
social welfare function that reflects both aggregate consumption and distribution); see also 
Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look At 
Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1905, 1918 n.56 (1987) (defending a welfarist 
approach to taxation). Diminishing marginal utility of consumption can also be incorporated 
into traditional cost-benefit analysis through the use of equity weighting. See David Anthoff 
& Richard S.J. Tol, On International Equity Weights and National Decision Making on Climate 
Change, 60 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 14, 14 (2010); Chris Hope, Discount Rates, Equity 
Weights and the Social Cost of Carbon, 30 ENERGY ECON. 1011, 1011, 1015 (2008). However, 
altering legal rules to effectuate distribution goals may not be efficient in many cases. Mi-
chael A. Livermore & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, The Shape of Distributional Analysis, in THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 69, 76–78 (2013) 
(discussing Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994)). 
 161. The recent history of progressive income taxation in the United States is illustra-
tive. Effective tax rates for the wealthiest segments of society have fallen precipitously in the 
past three decades. E.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX 
RATES: 1979 TO 2005 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ 
ftpdocs/88xx/doc8885/12-11-historicaltaxrates.pdf. 
 162. Cf. Daniel Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High Income Improves Evaluation of Life 
But Not Emotional Well-Being, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16,489, 16,489–90 (2010) (explor-
ing the relationship between income level and subjective well-being). 
 163. Richard A. Easterlin et al., The Happiness-Income Paradox Revisited, 107 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 22,463, 22,463 (2010). See also Richard A. Easterlin, Does Economic Growth 
Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence, in NATIONS AND HOUSEHOLDS IN 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MOSES ABRAMOVITZ 89, 118 (Paul A. David 
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be partially explained by, the concept of the “hedonic treadmill” introduced 
by Brickman and Campbell.164 According to these authors, human beings 
adapt to changes in their life circumstances, so that even extreme improve-
ments or declines in the state of their material welfare will have only 
transitory effects on their subjective happiness.165 Easterlin has also pro-
posed that “[i]ndividuals assess their material well-being, not in terms of 
the absolute amount of goods they have, but relative to a social norm of 
what goods they ought to have.”166 This phenomenon can exist not only for 
total consumption amounts, but also at the level of particular goods, often 
referred to as “positional goods.”167  
If some types of consumption are driven by positional goods, there is 
another opportunity to make improvements in environmental quality with-
out decreasing other elements of well-being. Measures like an automobile 
fuel economy standard that reduce the average size or weight for all vehicles 
on the road could achieve fuel savings for consumers (and generate envi-
ronmental benefits) without reducing consumer welfare because the relative 
                                                                                                                      
& Melvin W. Reder eds., 1974); Richard A. Easterlin, Does Money Buy Happiness?, 30 PUB. 
INT. 3 (1973). This finding has been the subject o� lively empirical debate. Compare Michael 
R. Hagerty & Ruut Veenhoven, Wealth and Happiness Revisited, 64 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 1 
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 164. P. Brickman & D.T. Campbell, Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good Society, in 
ADAPTATION LEVEL THEORY: A SYMPOSIUM 287 (M.H. Appley ed., 1971). 
 165. The hedonic treadmill is itself only one potential failure of “affective forecast-
ing”—the attempt to predict how changes in consumption or circumstances will affect 
subjective well-being. See Daniel Kahneman & Richard H. Thaler, Anomolies: Utility Maximi-
zation and Experienced Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 221 (2006); Daniel Kahneman, Objective 
Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 3, 13 (Daniel 
Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2003) (discussing research on P. Brickman, 
Dan Coates, & Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness 
Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978)); see also Ed Diener et al., Beyond 
the Hedonic Treadmill: Revising the Adaptation Theory of Well-Being, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
305, 313 (2006) (“Adaptation is a powerful force, but it is not so complete and automatic that 
it will defeat all efforts to change well-being.”). It is worth noting that there is obviously no 
theoretical reason why hedonic adaptation could not also operate with respect to environ-
mental degradation as well.  
 166. Easterlin, Does Money Buy Happiness?, supra note 163, at 4. 
 167. See ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND 
THE QUEST FOR STATUS 7 (1985) (citing FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 
(1976)); Fredrik Carlsson et al., Do You Enjoy Having More Than Others? Survey Evidence of 
Positional Goods, 74 ECONOMICA 586, 587, 596 (2007); see also ROBERT H. FRANK, THE 
DARWIN ECONOMY: LIBERTY, COMPETITION, AND THE COMMON GOOD 68–74 (2011); 
RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 45 (2005). 
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position of cars in a marketplace populated by smaller cars would be unaf-
fected.168 
While positional goods theory may provide some opportunities for pol-
icymakers to make environmental improvements at low cost, there are likely 
to be important limits. For countries at lower levels of development, con-
sumption may not be particularly positional.169 Even in high-income 
countries, there is some disagreement as to how important position is for 
many consumer goods.170 Likewise, while an emphasis on increasing subjec-
tive well-being, rather than merely consumption, may have some important 
policy consequences,171 there will remain many areas of economic life, espe-
cially in developing countries, where consumption and subjective well-
being will be highly correlated. Nevertheless, additional research continues 
to yield valuable information about the relationship between economic 
activity and well-being.172 
An alternative framework takes the focus of development to be increas-
ing individuals’ capabilities to lead autonomous and fulfilling lives. The 
leading proponent of the capabilities approach is economist and philoso-
pher Amartya Sen. Grounded in a critique of moral theories that focus 
                                                                                                                      
 168. Inst. for Pol’y Integrity, Are Passenger Vehicles Positional Goods? Consumer Welfare 
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 171. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being 
Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 passim (2013). 
 172. See, e.g., James K. Harter & Raksha Arora, The Impact of Time Spent Working and 
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Experiment, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 3109 (2011) (finding that happier people report reduced 
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exclusively on utility or resources,173 Sen proposes that economic prosperity 
not be understood as “the object of the entire exercise” of “planning and 
policy-making,” but rather as “an intermediate goal, the importance of 
which is contingent on what it ultimately contributes to human lives.”174 
That relevant ultimate goal he calls “capabilities.”  
For Sen, capabilities represent the ability of people to do certain basic 
things such as “meet one’s nutritional requirements, [have] the wherewithal 
to be clothed and sheltered, [and have] the power to participate in the social 
life of the community.”175 These capabilities “reflect[] a person’s freedom to 
choose between different ways o� living”176 and the “ability to do valuable 
acts or reach valuable states o� being.”177 The term capability “represent[s] 
the alternative combinations of things a person is able to do or be—the 
various ‘functionings’ he or she can achieve.”178  
The capabilities approach has been influential and has, to a limited de-
gree, been implemented into policy through such measures as the U.N. 
Human Development Index, which has been strongly influenced by Sen.179 
The index is “an aggregate measure of progress in three dimensions—
health, education and income.”180 While self-consciously an incomplete 
measure of capabilities, the index “was devised explicitly as a rival to GNP” 
for measuring development; Sen has praised the index for “work[ing] as a 
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195–220 (Sterling M. McMurring ed., 1980), reprinted in AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE 
AND MEASUREMENT (1982). 
 174. Amartya Sen, Development as Capability Expansion, 19 J. DEV. PLAN. 41, 41–42 
(1989), reprinted in READINGS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 3 (Sakiko Fakuda-Parr & A.K. 
Shiva Kumar eds., 2005). 
 175. Sen, supra note 173, at 218. 
 176. Sen, supra note 174, at 44. 
 177. Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, 30 (Martha 
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).  
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environment. Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
273, 287–88 (1997). 
 179. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, THE REAL WEALTH OF NATIONS: PATHWAYS TO 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, at 16 (2010), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR 
_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf (“Sen’s perspective deeply informs this Report”). 
 180. Id. at 15. 
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simple measure like GNP but, unlike GNP, without being oblivious of 
everything other than incomes and commodities.”181 
Adoption of capabilities as the measure of economic progress may also 
create opportunities to move toward the green growth frontier. Because 
many of these capabilities have little or no relationship to consumption, 
well-being can be improved without consumption growth, helping to de-
link, to some degree, development goals from environmental degradation. 
Redirecting government attention toward capabilities that can be increased 
in ways that place minimal burdens on the environment, perhaps by shift-
ing investment resources toward improving educational opportunities, has 
the potential to move countries further upward across both growth and 
environmental dimensions. 
In selecting policies that affect growth, countries have a choice among a 
variety of alternative development paths. Green growth is achieved by 
polices that—whatever their economic goals—achieve those aims at the 
lowest possible environmental cost. Green growth does not require sacrific-
ing development, but it demands that thought and consideration go into the 
environmental costs of growth, and that wasteful policies that cause unnec-
essary environmental harm be avoided. Whether the goal of social policy is 
directed toward preference satisfaction, well-being, subjective happiness, 
increasing human capabilities, or some amalgam of all of these, careful 
attention to how policies affect those outcomes, to the alternative policies 
that are available, and to the relative environmental consequences of those 
policy choices can help countries achieve their growth goals in the greenest 
possible manner.  
B. Regulatory Quality 
Improving the effectiveness of government regulation—sometimes re-
ferred to as “regulatory quality”182—has been the focus of two significant 
reforms efforts on opposite sides of the Atlantic over the past several dec-
ades. In the United States, the “regulatory reform”183 movement, which 
began in the late 1970s, grew out of a general sense of dissatisfaction with 
the ability of government institutions to achieve social goals—like environ-
mental and consumer protection—without imposing undue burdens on the 
                                                                                                                      
 181. Id. at vi. 
 182. See OECD, Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Improving the Quality of 
Government Regulation, at 11, C(95)21/Final (Mar. 9, 1995), available at http://acts.oecd.org/ 
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Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory Muddle: The “Legislative Mirage” of Single Statute Regu-
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private marketplace.184 This regulatory reform movement, which had sup-
porters from both sides of the political spectrum185 (as well as some strong 
detractors, especially on the left186) developed a set of institutional and 
instrumental recommendations that have helped set the terms of the debate 
over regulatory issues in the United States for several decades. Though 
implementation of the prescriptions of the regulatory reform movement is 
far from universal, there are a large number of important areas where they 
have been extremely influential. 
In Europe, the reform movement took place somewhat later, under the 
name “Better Regulation,” but many of the underlying concerns that drove 
the regulatory reform movement in the United States, including interna-
tional competitiveness and economic stagnation, were also important 
motivations.187 The Better Regulation movement has focused on a similar 
set of institutional and instrumental changes as were proposed in the Unit-
ed States, but it was shaped and tailored for the European context.188  
Regulatory quality initiatives have traditionally been based on the as-
sumption that, in general, private markets will be the most efficient 
arrangement for the production and delivery of goods and services.189 Both 
economic theory and practical experience have shown that private markets, 
fostered and sustained by government institutions, can be extremely effi-
cient at processing information, coordinating private actions, harnessing 
innovation, and dynamically responding to new developments. Whatever 
the shortfalls of private markets in any individual instance (from a domestic 
asset bubble to a global environmental externality) the usefulness of private 
markets for facilitating economic activity is widely recognized.  
The advantages of private markets, and the need to avoid hampering 
those advantages, strongly inform these regulatory quality movements. 
Government policies can easily come into conflict with core elements of the 
market economy. Regulations that interfere with price signals, for example, 
                                                                                                                      
 184. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 92, at 21–27; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinvent-
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are strongly disfavored by regulatory quality advocates because they have 
the potential to cause the misallocation of social resources and the distor-
tion of production decisions.190 Similarly, government regimes that favor 
existing market incumbents, impede trade, or subsidize specific technology 
have been criticized for undermining domestic and international competi-
tion.191 Avoiding the conflict between government policy and smooth 
market functioning is one of the goals of regulatory quality initiatives. 
At the same time, the role of governments in actively promoting pri-
vate markets is broadly recognized.192 For well-functioning private markets 
to flourish, governments must protect private property, courts must enforce 
contracts, infrastructure must be developed to encourage commerce, and 
investments must be made in education to promote worker productivity. 
Where private markets fail to maximize social goals because of externalized 
costs or benefits, macroeconomic effects, behavioral factors, or inegalitarian 
distribution of wealth or opportunity, government action may be required 
to maximize social well-being. Regulatory quality requires that the positive 
role of governments to foster efficient private markets be recognized along-
side the need for policymakers to avoid market-frustrating actions. 
Both regulatory reform in the United States and Better Regulation in 
Europe tend to take economic effectiveness as their central objective. The 
level of protection for social goods, like environmental quality or worker 
safety, was less of an emphasis than was achieving those goals at the lowest 
cost.193 Tools like cost-effectiveness analysis have been promoted as a way 
to require government decisonmakers to carry out their mandates in the 
least burdensome manner possible.  
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Green growth, with its focus on achieving economic goals at the lowest 
possible environmental cost, should fit very comfortably within the tradi-
tion of these regulatory quality movements. Over the past several decades, 
regulatory quality initiatives have generated valuable experience about 
increasing governmental effectiveness, the institutions and instruments 
required, and how to tailor reforms can to specific circumstances. Although 
there have been failures as well as successes, and criticism as well as praise, 
the regulatory quality movements provide a useful template that can be 
drawn from by governments seeking to generate green growth policies. 
Many of the core institutional reforms that are associated with regula-
tory quality movements are centered around ensuring that government 
decisionmakers have access to, and consider, information on regulatory 
impacts. The same type of institutional innovations that were developed to 
promote regulatory quality can also help governments select policy options 
on the green growth frontier. 
One important avenue into which attempts to collect and process in-
formation has been channeled is the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), 
probably the most widely recognized regulatory quality practice. RIA has 
become widespread in a number of domestic contexts, and its use continues 
to grow with support from international bodies like the OECD and strong 
traditions in the United States and Europe.194 In addition, use o� RIA “as 
an aid to environmental decision making has expanded in recent years in 
countries throughout Latin America, Asia, and Africa.”195 
RIA has been defined by the OECD as “a systematic policy tool used 
to examine and measure the likely benefits, costs and effects of new or 
existing regulation.”196 Important elements include “the objective and in-
tended effect of the regulatory policy, an evaluation of the policy problem, 
consideration of alternative options, assessment of all their impacts [and] 
distribution, results of public consultation, compliance strategies, and pro-
cesses for monitoring and evaluation.”197 In a guidance document created by 
the U.S. Office o� Information and Regulatory Affairs, components of a 
proper RIA include a statement of “an appropriate baseline (i.e., best  
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assessment o� how the world would look in the absence of the proposed 
action)” and “a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended 
regulation justify its costs (recognizing that some benefits and costs are 
difficult to quantify).”198 
RIAs can take a number of different forms, depending on the scope of 
the proposed regulatory intervention, the information that is available, and 
the resources at the disposal of the analyst. Less extensive forms o� RIA 
include cost-effectiveness analysis, which examines a range of regulatory 
alternatives and determines the cost-per-unit of different interventions.199 
For example, a cost-effectiveness analysis could determine the cost-per-life-
saved of a measure to improve highway safety.200 Regulatory budgeting, 
which allocates a certain amount of private costs that can be imposed by an 
agency, and requires the agency to maximize the public benefit that is gen-
erated by the imposition of those costs, is related to cost-effectiveness 
analysis and RIAs more generally.201 Breakeven analysis is sometimes used 
when there is an absence of information about an important variable. For 
example, the U.S. Department o� Homeland Security, recognizing that it 
does not know how effective security requirements at airports are in reduc-
ing terrorism risks, conducts breakeven analyses to determine how much of 
a risk reduction would be necessary for those rules to have greater benefits 
than costs.202 
There are two ways in which a system of regulatory assessment can 
help promote the green growth agenda. First, regulatory assessment can be 
used to ensure that environmental protection initiatives are undertaken in 
ways that are the least costly from the perspective of economic growth. 
Assessment of the goals of a policy, the alternative methods for achieving 
those goals, and the costs associated with the different policy options give 
decisionmakers valuable information that can be used to push policy toward 
the green growth frontier. Second, regulatory assessment of economic poli-
cies and their impacts on the environment can ensure that choices fall along 
the green growth frontier. There are many different steps that policymakers 
can take to stimulate growth, including opening up protected areas for 
natural resource development, increasing educational opportunities for 
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women, or promoting business loans to innovative start-up companies. 
These economic development policies can have a wide range of environ-
mental effects, from severe depletion of natural resources to environmental 
quality improvements. As governments evaluate the choices they have for 
promoting economic growth, they can be sure to consider the full range of 
regulatory options and programs in light of their respective environmental 
costs. 
It can be difficult to achieve significant regulatory reforms where the 
incumbent regulatory regime is wasteful, duplicative, and overly expansive, 
or where political gridlock stands in the way of efforts to improve regulato-
ry quality. For nations transitioning from a state-controlled system to a 
market system, or where regulatory sprawl has resulted from a lack of insti-
tutional coordination, an important initial step is often the elimination of 
costly and outdated rules. One method that has proved successful in 
streamlining and modernizing regulatory regimes is the so-called regulatory 
guillotine.203 This technique typically involves the passage of a law empow-
ering a board to review existing rules and to recommend their repeal if 
those rules are illegal, unnecessary, or overly burdensome.  
A “green guillotine” would be a variation on this idea. Rather than a 
board commissioned for the purpose of eliminating illegal and unnecessary 
regulations, the board’s goal would be to review rules to determine whether 
they, in whole or in part, impose an economic or environmental burden 
without a corresponding benefit. This procedure would effectively function 
as a check for common sense, taking both economic and environmental 
concerns into account.  
Substantive information requirements have often been accompanied by 
independent institutions empowered to review agency decisionmaking. 
Review of regulatory initiatives in the United States is housed in all three 
branches of the federal government. Independent courts have played a very 
important historical role in policing the activities o� federal agencies.204 The 
U.S. Congress has a variety o� formal and informal tools at its disposal, 
from the yearly budgetary process to the ability to demand information and 
hold public hearings that it uses to exercise some degree of review of agency 
decisions.205 
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The most recent innovation in the United States, which coincided with 
the regulatory review movement, was the establishment of an executive 
review function within a White House office.206 Starting under President 
Ronald Reagan, every president has required that administrative agencies 
conduct cost-benefit analyses of their proposed rulemakings and submit 
those documents to the White House for review. The institution o� White 
House review of agency actions has received support from both major U.S. 
political parties, and is now firmly ingrained in the administrative pro-
cess.207 
In Europe, the ability to conduct regulatory review is also spread with-
in different institutions. The European Court of Justice has the power 
under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union208 to conduct 
oversight over regulatory actions.209 More broadly, in 2006, the Impact 
Assessment Board (IAB) was created within the European Commission as 
part of its Better Regulation effort. The role of the IAB is to examine and 
issue opinions on the impact assessments that have been conducted by the 
directorates-general.210 The IAB works directly under the authority of the 
Commission President, and is meant to be independent from the direc-
torates-general, whose work the IAB reviews. Though they are not formally 
binding, the IAB has the power to offer recommendations and request that 
impact assessments be resubmitted after further analysis, giving it substan-
tial informal force.211 
An additional promising institutional innovation may be “expert con-
sensus proposal systems,” which involve the use of expert panels to 
introduce consensus reforms for adoption by political bodies.212 Typically, a 
legislative body, recognizing the need for action but unable to reach an 
agreement, commissions a diverse group of experts to assemble a package of 
reforms by consensus, which is later amended and either ratified or rejected 
by the legislature.213 Informal panels not commissioned by the legislature 
can also be effective for introducing reform where the panel’s diversity and 
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expertise are particularly weighty.214 For green growth, expert panels might 
consist of scientists, lawyers, and business professionals who have a stake in 
reform. The object of their inquiry could be anything from eliminating 
barriers to entry for green industries and the facilitation of green finance to 
the reform of environmentally destructive legal rules or subsidies. Whether 
established formally by the legislature or informally by private initiative, 
expert panels can inform discussion of green growth in government. 
Overall, attempts to improve regulatory quality can help facilitate 
green growth by maximizing the social value of investments in economic 
growth or environmental quality. Some tradeoffs must be made between 
these social goals, but regulatory quality initiatives can help ensure that 
those tradeoffs are made in the most efficient way possible. By collecting 
and aggregating information and subjecting regulatory decisionmaking to 
independent oversight, tools like regulatory impact analysis and institutions 
like the IAB have the potential to contribute to green growth by improving 
environmental and economic policymaking. 
C. Green Growth in Practice  
Although the green growth agenda, as given here, has not been clearly 
articulated before, it represents, at some level, an obviously attractive public 
policy goal, and governments in a wide range of contexts have already 
begun putting it into practice. This section discusses some attempts to 
promote green growth.  
1. Environmental Impact Statements 
Regulatory policies are an appropriate lever to promote green growth, 
but economic productivity itself often takes place at the micro level. For 
over forty years, environmental impact assessment has been used to esti-
mate the environmental effects of projects and help avoid unnecessary 
environmental costs.215 The United States was the first to adopt a broad 
environmental assessment requirement with the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),216 which sparked a global trend that has seen 
many jurisdictions around the world adopt some type of environmental 
assessment requirement.217 While NEPA requires that agencies be in-
formed with regard to the environmental effects of a proposal, it does not 
require that any specific action be taken to minimize negative effects or to 
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abstain from plans likely to cause significant harm.218 Nevertheless, the 
simple identification of environmental costs can spur deliberation about 
measures to achieve project goals while mitigating negative environmental 
consequences. These assessments, conducted at the level of public policy as 
well as for individual projects, are the most widely used tool of environ-
mental law in the world219 and provide a foundation for more ambitious 
efforts to incorporate green growth into government decisionmaking.  
An important step would be the improvement of environmental as-
sessment regimes as implemented on the ground. Perhaps the single largest 
challenge is the lack of post-implementation monitoring.220 Monitoring is 
critical, both because it brings continued attention to the environmental 
effects of a project and because it aids in the development o� better assess-
ments in the future by testing the predictions made by past analyses. The 
United States does not have a consistent monitoring requirement,221 and 
international lenders that require that environmental assessments be done 
for projects in developing countries often do not require ongoing monitor-
ing.222 There is, therefore, substantial room for improvement; increased 
monitoring in the environmental assessment process would be an important 
step in achieving green growth goals that builds on decades of relevant 
experience. 
Expansion of environmental assessment to include policy-level choices 
has also been proposed, under the rubric of Strategic Environmental As-
sessment (SEA). The European Union has been at the forefront of 
adopting SEA requirements, with the European Parliament acting in 
2001.223  
In addition, the OECD,224 World Bank,225 and U.N. also advocate  
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wider use of SEA, especially in developing countries.226 SEA could benefit 
from the use of the green growth frontier as a way to standardize and clari-
fy the analysis. The OECD calls for the integration of social, economic, and 
environmental analysis in SEA,227 and the concept of green growth can help 
clarify the policy goal that is promoted by this analysis. Amending SEA to 
include green growth could make environmental review more practical for 
the evaluation o� local as well as national and international policies and 
programs. 
2. Market Incentives 
Market incentive-based regulatory approaches, such as environmental 
taxes and cap-and-trade systems, have been long promoted as an economi-
cally efficient approach that reduces pollution at the lowest possible 
economic cost.228 Even though, from an economic standpoint, the desirabil-
ity of market mechanisms are obvious,229 there are many political decisions 
that must be made that can generate substantial roadblocks to implementa-
tion and can even interfere (sometimes substantially) with effectiveness. 
The history of environmental taxes shows their sui generis political origins: 
British Columbia introduced a carbon tax—the first in North America—in 
2008, shortly after a 2006 Canadian winter that was the second warmest in 
recorded history.230 In the United States, the Love Canal disaster, in which 
200 homes in upstate New York built on top of a toxic waste dump were 
evacuated because of public health concerns, precipitated the creation of an 
environmental tax on hazardous chemicals.231 Sweden’s carbon tax was 
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implemented in 1990 to fulfill its Rio Declaration commitments that re-
quired the country to stabilize its carbon emissions.232 
Because market tools can be used to raise revenue, questions about the 
distribution of that revenue can impede, or even halt, political progress.233 
Interest groups can also seek exemptions from environmental taxes.234 In 
British Columbia, the carbon tax applies primarily to transportation fuels, 
natural gas, and fuel used in industrial processes, with other sources exclud-
ed. 235 In Sweden’s iterations of the tax, industries including manufacturing, 
agriculture, and forestry pay a lower rate than the general level.236 In Nor-
way, the pulp and paper, fishmeal, domestic aviation, and domestic 
shipping industries pay reduced rates as well.237 Differential rates and 
broad exemptions can both undermine both the effectiveness and the effi-
ciency of environmental taxes. 
Although market-based mechanisms to control pollution are very desir-
able from a green growth perspective, political barriers often impede or 
distort their implementation. In part because countries have been slow to 
replace traditional pollution-control regimes with market tools, substantial 
gains remain to be had if these political barriers are overcome. 
3. New Governance 
The “new governance” approach to achieving public policy goals, which 
seeks alternatives to “top-down” government regulation such as “collabora-
tive private-public rule-making efforts” and “the promotion of government-
supported self-regulation,” has become increasingly popular in recent 
years.238 While “[s]cholars have expressed very different views on the  
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significance of new governance,”239 prominent commentators have argued 
that any genuine understanding of the administrative and regulatory state 
must come to grips with the role that private actors play in the design, 
implementation, and enforcement of government policy.240 At the most 
practical level, new governance is associated with a range of non-traditional 
regulatory tools such as those included within the EU Water Framework 
Directive, a “radical approach” that “mixes binding legal rules and standards 
with non-binding forms of cooperation, information pooling, and guid-
ance.”241 
New governance tools provide many opportunities for green growth 
considerations to be incorporated into policymaking. By shifting the focus 
away from zero-sum battles that pit environmental interests against  
economic actors and toward policy options that are mutually beneficial, 
green growth accords well with the emphasis within new governance on 
cooperation between the regulated community and government. And with-
in the complex negotiations that are taken as a foundational premise of new 
governance, solutions on the green growth frontier can serve as points of 
agreement around which broader consensus on policy choices can be devel-
oped. 
One recent major policy development in the United States that had el-
ements o� both green growth and new governance was the “car deal” 
negotiated by the Barack Obama Administration and embodied in a joint 
rulemaking by the EPA and Department o� Transportation to substantially 
increase fuel-efficiency requirements for new automobiles.242 The “deeply 
consultative and deliberative process” around the car deal, which heavily 
involved regulated industry, resulted in the dramatic step of “letters of 
commitment signed by each manufacturer” agreeing not to challenge the 
rule in court.243 As discussed above, there are many reasons why energy 
efficiency policies can help move societies toward the green growth frontier, 
including the positional nature of certain goods and behavioral quirks that 
drive individuals to make consumer choices that not only impose external 
environmental costs but fail to maximize their own preferences over the 
long-term. The car deal—in both its new governance style of negotiation 
and cooperation as well as in the green-growth-promoting policy outcomes 
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that resulted—provides a useful model for future efforts to advance the 
green growth agenda. 
4. National Industrial Policy  
Many countries, to one extent or another, engage in some forms of na-
tional industrial policy in which domestic governments become “directly 
involved in establishing national industrial goals and in assuring that the 
goals are achieved.”244 Industrial policy is controversial among economists. 
Fears include the creation of opportunities for special interest groups to 
capture government policymaking, the adoption of inefficient policies like 
trade protection and subsidies, and the inability of governments to identify, 
“before the fact, a ‘winning’ industrial structure.”245 Industrial policy has 
supporters as well, with some recent work emphasizing the need for gov-
ernments to support economic innovation in particular.246 The sustained 
expansion of the Chinese economy, which features an extremely strong 
government role in setting industrial policy, has spurred renewed interest in 
how government support for specific economic sectors can help fuel growth, 
especially in developing countries.247  
Green growth is highly relevant for structuring national industrial poli-
cy. Putting aside the merits of whether industrial policy is a wise course of 
action, once a government has committed to establishing and promoting 
industrial goals, there is vast room for the green growth concept to inform 
policy choices. The energy sector, in particular, provides opportunities for 
choices between more or less environmentally damaging industrial policy 
strategies. In the United States, for example, there are a number of tax and 
regulatory subsidies for highly polluting sources of energy such as coal.248 
The grandfathering of sources that pre-date modern emissions controls may 
be the largest such subsidy, but beneficial tax treatment is also important. 
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At the same time, new policies that promote renewable energy, including 
tax credits, have also been adopted. Countries, then, have a choice in how 
they design industrial policy geared toward the energy sector: they can prop 
up polluting technologies or encourage the adoption of cleaner, less pollut-
ing approaches. 
Because, by definition, industrial policy involves deep intervention by 
the government into the economy, there are many opportunities for green 
growth to be promoted or undermined. If governments decide that the 
support of specific industrial goals is appropriate, the choice of competing 
goals and the selection of policies for achieving those goals can be informed 
by the concept of green growth: goals and policies that have the lowest 
environmental costs should be systematically preferred. The debate over 
industrial policy is likely to continue for some time, but there should be 
broad consensus around the desirability of policies that achieve the same 
economic results with fewer negative environmental consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has discussed the meaning of green growth, including how 
it is distinct from concepts like sustainable development and cost-benefit 
analysis. It also examines how theoretical recommendations about desirable 
public policy choices can be put into practice. The core definition offered 
here is the green growth frontier, which is the set of policies that maximize 
economic goals and environmental quality. Along the frontier, tradeoffs 
between these two domains are necessary, but policy choices that move 
societies toward the frontier create opportunities for economic or environ-
mental progress that does not come at the expense of the other social 
objective. Although policies that trade economic progress for environmental 
quality, or vice versa, are likely to generate substantial political controversy, 
movements toward the green growth frontier offer opportunities for broad-
er consensus and acceptance. At a time when many governments face 
growing environmental risks, in addition to perpetual pressure to generate 
economic development, green growth policies allow societies to achieve the 
maximum return for their investment in economic or environmental pro-
gress, however they decide to balance these sometimes competing social 
priorities.  
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